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PLAIN AMBIGUITIES IN THE CLEAR
ARTICULATION REQUIREMENT FOR
STATE. ACTION ANTITRUST IMMUNITY:
THE CASE OF STATE AGENCIES
C. DOUGLAS FLOYD*
Abstract: This Article focuses on the application of the state action
antitrust inimunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown to the regulatory
programs of state administrative agencies having statewide jurisdiction.
It concludes that state agencies should be subject to significantly
different requirements for antitrust immunity than are local
governmental units. This Article also addresses unresolved issues that
frequently recur in the context of state administrative action, such as
the effect of retroactive intetpretations of state policy by a state agency,
whether the clear articulation and active supervision requirements for
antitrust immunity play any separate role in the context of
administrative policy making, and whether any distinctions should be
drawn among the processes of rulemaking, adjudication, and tariff
approval in applying the Parker doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
In a series of decisions over the last twenty-five years, 1 the United
States Supreme Court has articulated a modern reformulation of the
state action antitrust immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown. 2 The Court
has established a three-part test, under which the acts of a state legis-
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. B.S., Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. 1964; J.D., Stanford, 1967. I wish to thank Professors Jean Wegman
Burns and ThoMas D. Morgan for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this Arti-
cle, and Allyson Davidson and Shane Keppner for their invaluable research assistance.
' Federal Trade C01111/111 v. Ticor Title his. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor . Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Patrick v. Burgct, 486 U.S. 94 (1988);
Town• of Millie v. City of E.att Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 4(W) U.S. 558 (1984);
Community CommitniCations Co. v. City of Boater,. 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'u v. Midcal Aluminum, 'Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 3l 7 U.S. 341 (1943).
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lature or a state supreme court acting in its legislative capacity are ipso
facto immune without further inquiry,3 the acts of municipalities and
other subordinate governmental entities are immune only if under-
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, 4 and the acts of
private parties pursuant to a state program of regulation are immune
only if they are both pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and
actively supervised by the state. 5
 The Court has explained that be-
cause municipalities are not themselves sovereign, the dear articula-
tion requirement is necessary to ensure that their acts truly represent
the sovereign policy of the state itself. 6 The additional active supervi-
sion requirement for the conduct of private actors is necessary be-
cause, unlike local governmental units, private actors cannot be pre-
sumed to act in the public interest.'
Unfortunately, the Court's attempt to clearly articulate definitive
requirements for state action antitrust immunity has produced more
confusion than clarity in the lower federal courts and has engendered
substantial and ongoing scholarly criticism. 8 The criticism itself, how-
ever, has hardly been of one voice. One important article has sug-
gested that the Court's attempt to distinguish public and private ac-
tion is fundamentally misguided; rather, the article maintains that the
proper focus is on whether the regulation at issue is inefficient and
3 Hoover; 466 U.S. at 568; Bates, 433 U.S. at 359.
4 Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45-46.
5 Midcai, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 410).
6
 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 53.
7 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45.
8 See generally, e.g, Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.
LAW & ECON. 23 (1983); Eimer Richard El ►ange, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 667 (1991); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987); Daniell Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, The Commerce
Clause and the Sherman Act: Ilk We Should Follow a Consistent Free•Market Policy, 44 EtctoRY L.J.
1227 (1995); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. MacKerron III, Municipal Regulation and Fed-
eral Antitrust Policy, '32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985); Robert P. Intinan & Daniel L. Rtabinfehl,
Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jortle, Antitrust
and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV.
227 (1987); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption /Vier Mitical Alumni LIM, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1099 (1981)
[hereinafter Page, Antitrust]; William H. Page, Capture, Clear Articulation, and Legitimacy: A
Reply to Professor Wiley, 61 S. CAI.. L. REV. 1343 (1988) [hereinafter Page, Capture]; William
H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory
of Legislation, 1987 DUKE 14. 618 (1987) [hereinafter Page, Interest Groups]; Matthew L.
Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1988); John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986).
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whether it was the product of "capture" by private interests. 9 This cap-
ture theory has, in turn, produced critics of its own.t 0 Still others have
argued variously that the focus should be on whether the regulation
in question has extra-jurisdictional spillover effects not subject to
meaningful political check" or whether the regulation was the prod-
uct of a financially interested decision maker, public or private. 12 A
number of commentators proceed on the premise that because the
now-accepted objective of the antitrust laws is to achieve allocative
efficiency, the contours of the state action doctrine should focus on
whether according immunity for the conduct in question is consistent
with that efficiency goal's
A strong undercurrent of much of this criticism has been that the
Court's current state action immunity doctrine, through its clear ar-
ticulation and active supervision requirements, imposes a costly sys-
tem of "command and control" regulation on the states as the price of
obtaining antitrust immunity for their regulatory programs." This
impairs the very interests of federalism that it was meant to promote.
Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that proper respect for
state sovereignty means that states should be able to repeal the anti-
trust laws outright if they wish 15 or, alternatively, to delegate the power
to engage in anti-competitive conduct entirely to private parties with-
out any further governmental supervision or constraint. 0
Academic criticism of current state action immunity doctrine has
had little discernable impact on the decisions of the Supreme Court.
None of the Court's seminal decisions, with their focus on the distinc-
tion between private and govermnental action, and their require-
ments for clear articulation of governmental policy and active super-
vision of private conduct, have shown any inclination to change the
focus of their analysis to "agency capture" by private interests, to
whether the decision makers at issue are financially interested, or to
whether the state's regulatory regime is consistent with the efficiency
g See generally Wiley, supra note 8.
1" See generally, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 8; Page, Interest Grumps, supra note 8; Page, Cap-
sure, supra note 8; Spitzer, supra note 8.	 •
11 See generally,	 Jorde, supra note 8..
12 See generally, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 8.
11 See generally, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 8; 1 - lovenka ► y & MacKerron, supra note 8;
Spitzer, supra note 8.
14 See generally, e.g., Easterbrook, supra ► iote 8; Jordc, supra note 8; Page, Antitrust, supra
note 8; Wiley, •copra note 8.
Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 29, 38; Wiley, sepia note 8, at 729-30.
16 Wiley, supra note 8, at 731.
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goals of the antitrust laws. Indeed, the Court's holding in City of Co-
lumbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, that neither allegations that a city
council had conspired with regulated private interests nor allegations
of bribery or corruption by public officials are sufficient to vitiate
state action antitrust immunity, implicitly undercuts the premises of
much of the previous criticism of the Parker doctrine and calls for a
fresh reexamination of the subject.°
Parker v. Brown was concerned with a system of production re-
straint for an agricultural commodity imposed by a state administra-
tive agency. 18
 Although the Supreme Court's subsequent development
and refinement of the Parker doctrine frequently has involved the ac-
tions of local governmental units, 19 some of its most important deci-
sions, like Parker itself, have been concerned with the anticompetitive
regulatory programs of state agencies. 2° A significant and rapidly in-
creasing body of recent authority in the federal courts of appeals also
addresses the application of the Parker doctrine in that context. 21
Ironically, in view of the Parker doctrine's origins, and the significance
of state-wide agencies in developing state policy through rule making
and adjudication, the Supreme Court has devoted little attention to
the scope of immunity for statewide regulatory programs developed
by state agencies under general delegations of authority by the state
legislature.
To the extent that it has inferentially addressed the issue, the
Court's pronouncements have been delphic and inconsistent. At
times it has suggested that the same clear articulation requirement
applicable to subordinate governmental units also should apply to
17
 499 U.S. at 365. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
18 Parker, 317 U.S. at 344.
19 See, e.g., Omni, 499 U.S. at 365; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 34; Community Contmunica-
lions, 455 U.S. at 40; Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 389.
28 Thor, 504 U.S. at 621; Patrick, 486 U.S. at 94; Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 48;
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 570.
21
 See generally, e.g., Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Pro-
gram, 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999); Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envd.
Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998); Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139
F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 1998); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential Property & Casualty Joint
Underwriting Ass'n, 137 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1998); Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Port-
land Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997); California CNG, Inc. v. Southern Cal.
Gas Co., 96 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.' 1996); Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d
609 (11th Cir. 1995); Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260
(3d Cir. 1994); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA, Inc., 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.
1987); Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp, 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984).
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state agencies.22 At others, it has suggested that state agencies them-
selves are empowered to clearly articulate anticompetitive policy for
the state." The Court also has declined to resolve whether, or in what
circumstances, an active supervision requirement should apply to
state agencies. 24
The body of academic commentary on the Parker doctrine simi-
larly has failed to focus specifically on the uniqueness of state agencies
and their programs and whether they possess special attributes that
should lead to distinct rules of antitrust immunity. A notable excep-
tion is a series of articles by William Page arguing that because agen-
cies are more likely to adopt regulatory programs that serve producer
interests than are state legislatures—and because agencies, unlike leg-
islatures, do not represent a wide range of interests and are not sub-
ject to direct popular control—only state legislatures should be able
to clearly articulate anticompetitive state policy entitled to immunity
under the Parker doctrine.25
Despite this lack of guidance, lower federal courts frequently and
increasingly have been confronted with difficult issues of antitrust
immunity in the context of important regulatory programs adopted
by administrative agencies of statewide jurisdiction. 26 Absent any
definitive guidance from the Stipreme Court, lower courts generally
have assumed that state agencies should be treated like municipalities
and other subordinate governmental units and that federal antitrust
iinmunity should be accorded to their programs only if they are
adopted pursuant to a clearly articulated policy adopted by the state
legislature or the state supreme court acting in a legislative capacity. 27
22 See, e.g., Southern Motor Carrims, 471 U.S. at 63 (holding actions or the slate legisla-
titres and state supreme courts ipso farm immune); see also Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568; Goldfa rb,
421 U.S. at 790-91.
23 See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 ("Requiring express authorization for every
action (hat an agency might find necessary to effectuate state policy would diminish, if not
destroy, its usefulness.").
24 Thaw of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 ("In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is
likely that active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here
decide that issue.").
25 See generally Page, Antitrust, supra' note 8; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8; Page,
Capture, supra note 8.
26 See supra note 21.
27 See, e.g., 1-lass v. Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
Oregon State Bar was a slate agency, but assuming that its requirement that all HICIllbers of
the state bar purchase malpractice Insurance from the Bar was sullied to the clear articula-
tion requirement); cf. Cost Nlanagement Servs., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co.. 99
F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cin 1996) (holding allegation that defendant engaged hi off-tariff pric-
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Similarly, they have assumed that, like municipalities, state agencies
are not subject to the active supervision requirement because, unlike
private parties, they may be presumed to act in the public interest. 28
These assumptions have not been universal, however. Some
courts have concluded that state agencies, like state legislatures,-
themselves may articulate anticompetitive state policy that is ipso facto
immune from federal antitrust scrutiny without further inquiry or
restraint." There also has been a suggestion that the degree of con-
straint should decrease as proximity to the center of state government
decreases, with state agencies subject to less constraint than munici-
palities and municipalities subject to less constraint than private ac-
tors."
This Article takes as its focus the application of the Parker doc-
trine to the regulatory programs of state administrative agencies hav-
ing statewide jurisdiction. It concludes that state agencies should be
subject to significantly different requirements for antitrust immunity
than are local governmental units. Additionally, this Article addresses
other unresolved issues that frequently recur in the administrative
context, such as the effect of retroactive interpretations or declara-
tions of state policy by a state agency, whether the clear articulation
and active supervision requirements—if they apply at all—play any
separate role in the context of administrative policy making, and
whether any distinction should be drawn between the process of ad-
ing of natural gas not immune despite authority of state utilities commission to police pric-
ing if off-tariff pricing was illegal tinder state law).
" See, e.g., Town of Hattie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.110 (in cases in which tlte actor is a state
agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be required, although we do
not here decide that issue."). See generally Porter Testing Lab. v. Board of Regents, 993 F.2d
768 (10th Cir. 1993).
29 See Neo Gen Screening, 187 F.3d at 24; Charley's Taxi, 810 F.2d at 869; Deak-Perra, 745
F.2d at 1281; Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973); see
also Automated Salvage, 155 17.3d at 59 (suggesting, without deciding, that state agency policy
determinations are ipso facto immune).
30 See Cine 42nd Street Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1049
(2d Cir. 1986) (Newman, J., concurring) ("The inquiry as to foreseeability ought to take
into account two variables—not only the scope of the statutory authority but also, and
perhaps more important, the proximity of the defendant's actions to the sovereign author-
ity of the state."); see also Southern Motor Carders, 471 U.S. at 64 (stating that, where state
agencies are involved, "as long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competi-
tion in a particular field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the illidca/ test is
satisfied."); TEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11(11
Cir. 1996) (holding that the actions of a state agency are properly considered in determin-
ing the specifics of state policy); Yeager's Fuel, 22 F.3d at 1268-69 (according weight to views
of state public utility commission in determining what state policy was).
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ministrative rule making and administrative • adjudication in applying
the Parker doctrine.
I suggest that one reason that neither the courts nor commenta-
tors have definitively addressed these issues is that the Supreme
Court's explication of the norms underlying its development of the
state action itunmnity doctrine has been inadequate. Unlike previous
commentary, however, I conclude that the Court's distinction between
state and local governmental action, and between private action and
public action, are not meaningless or formal, but rather, are fully
justified. The ongoing - confusion and difficulties that have attended
application of the Court's "trifurcated" approach to antitrust immu-
nity, particularly in the context Of state agency action, have resulted
not from these basic distinctions but from its failure to articulate the
implicit assumptions and premises underlying its Parker decisions with
sufficient clarity and to follow those premises to their logical conclu-
sion. The "laboratory case" of state agencies provides a fruitful field
for exploring these issues, not simply to answer the many unresolved
questions regarding antitrust immunity in that context, but to clarify
the basic premises of the Parker doctrine with implications for its ap-
plication in other settings as well.
I. BASIC PREMISES
A. State-wide Authoritativeness
Perhaps the most consistent feature of the Supreme Court's state
action immunity decisions has been the Court's insistence that only
the actions of entities acting pursuant to the policy of the "state as
sovereign" are entitled to Parker immunity. 31 On this ground, the
Court freely has accorded antitrust immunity for the actions and poli-
cies of state level entities such as the state legislature or state supreme
court.32 At the same time, however, the Court has refused to extend a
corresponding immunity to the actions and policies of local govern-
3/ See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 63
(1985) ("Parker immunity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken pur-
suant to a clearly articulated policy of the State itself, such as a policy approved by a stale
legislature ... or a State Supreme Court.").
52 See. e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
360-t12 (1977).
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mental entities or private individuals unguided by any overarching
state anticompetition norm."
This central theme of the Court's decisions applying the Parker
doctrine has engendered widespread criticism in academic commen-
tary on the state action immunity doctrine. 34
 This criticism has been
particularly strong with respect to the Court's decision in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., which concluded that cities are
not automatically protected by Parker. 35 The Court has also been criti-
cized for its decision that a broad delegation of "home rule" authority
to a municipal government is not a sufficient articulation of state anti-
competition policy to support an immunity claim in Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder. 36 The critics have argued that the
Court's restriction of immunity to governmental institutions author-
ized to speak for the state as a whole is "formalistic"37 and "mechani-
cal"" and that sovereign state policy may equally be expressed
through delegated and decentralized decisionmakers." The limita-
tion also has been challenged on the ground that it is fundamentally
contrary to the federalism basis of Parker itself because it improperly
limits the power of the state to choose the way in which state power
should be allocated among governmental units. 40
 Additionally, the
critics have argued that the Court's "anti-delegation" approach to
Parker immunity may frustrate the purposes of the antitrust laws by
forcing the states to adopt inefficient forms of "command and con-
trol" regulation 41
 and by impeding the decentralization of regulatory
authority to smaller units of government, which are the most efficient
53 Compare Town of I lallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41-43 (1985) (requiring a
clear articulation of state policy as a condition of municipal immunity), with California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1980) (requir-
ing both a clear articulation of state policy and active supervision of private conduct as
conditions of antitrust immunity for private individuals).
34
 See generally, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 8; Elhatige, supra note 8; Garland, supra
note 8; Gifford, supra note 8; llovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 8; Inman & Rubinfeld,
supra note 8; jorde, supra note 8; Page, Antitrust, supra note 8; Page, Capture, supra note 8;
Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8; Spitzer, supra note 8; Wiley, supra note 8.
35 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
36 455 U.S. at 40 (1982).
37 See Flovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 8, at 738-39.
38 See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 36-37.
35 See id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 8, at 670, 676, 682; Garland, supra note 8, at 502;
flovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 8, at 732, 758; jorde, supra note 8, at 237, 241-42;
Wiley, supra note 8, at 722, 731.
10 See id.
41 See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 30-31; jorde, supra note 8, at 249; Page, Antitrust,
supra note 8, at 1101; Spitzer, supra note 8, at 1299; Wiley, supra note 8, at 732-34.
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regulators of the inherently local problems they confront. 42 Finally,
some critics have charged that because smaller units of government
generally foster greater political participation, the Court's insistence
that Parker immunity applies only to policies adopted by •governmen-
tal entity exercising statewide authority frustrates the premises of rep-
resentative democracy. 45
In reality, however, the Supreme Court's insistence that only an
entity authorized to speak for the state as a whole is empowered to
confer immunity from the federal antitrust laws is much more defen-
sible than the critics have assumed. Critics who argue that the Court's
current formulation of the Parker doctrine may promote "inefficient"
forms of regulation improperly conflate the efficiency-based goals of
the antitrust laws themselves with those of the Parker doctrine. Parker
immunity was not designed to promote economic efficiency, but
rather, to protect the result of the state's political process even if that
result is fundamentally at odds with federal antitrust policy. 44
Similarly, critics who argue that the Court has engaged in "for-
malistic" line drawing and ignored the tenets of federalism disregard
the long established and analogous rule that the interests of federal-
ism undergirding the Eleventh Amendment's protection of the states
from suit in federal court do not extend to municipalities and other
subordinate governmental units. 45 Although this distinction has been
grounded in part on the Eleventh Amendment's explicit extension of
immunity from suit only to "one of the United States," 46 the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity has been extended well beyond its
literal terms to prohibit suits against state officers and state agencies
42 See Illovenkamp & MacKerron, supra - note 8, at 774.
43 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 1209, 1233, 1'249, 1255, 1284; Jorde, supra
note 8, at 249-50; Wiley, supra note 8, at 734.
44 See, e.g., Garland, supra note 8; ionic, sepal note 8, 251-52; Page, Interest Groups, su-
pra note 8, at 623.
13 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) ("The
bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States and slate
officials in appropriate circumstances ... but does not extend to counties and similar mu-
nicipal corporations."); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1800) ("Mtbile the
minty is territorially a part of the state, yet politically it is also a corporation created by
and with such powers as are given to it by the State. lit this respect it is a part of the Slate
only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be
said to be a part of the State.); see also Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 720-21
(1973) (pointing out the "independent corporate character" of California counties).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
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that operate as "arms of the state," as well as suits by a states' own citi-
zens—something not literally prohibited by the Amendment itself.47
Ultimately, the Court's decisions limiting the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment to agencies of statewide authority must be seen as an ex-
pression of its conclusion that the core purposes of the Amend-
ment—the protection of the state treasury from federal judgments
and the affront to the dignity of the state itself—are not sufficiently
implicated by federal suits against municipalities and other subordi-
nate units of state government exercising less than state-wide author-
ity.48
Although the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment are distinct
from that of Parker inninmity,49 it is no accident that the Supreme
Court's decisions refusing to extend Parker to the actions of munici-
palities and other local governmental units have relied explicitly on
the limited scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity." Parker was not
based on any express Congressional determination to exempt states
from overriding federal antitrust policy. Rather, that decision rested
on the Court's assumption that Congress would have said•so expressly
had it intended to subject sovereign states to a competition-based re-
gime focused on private anticompetitive restraints." Like other judi-
cially implied exemptions from the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court
has held that the Parker doctrine must be narrowly construed. 52 Given
the long-standing distinction under the Eleventh Amendment be-
tween the sovereign respect owed to states and state agencies on the
one hand, and to municipalities and other subordinate governmental
47 See, e.g., Edehnan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (stating that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars suits against statewide agency); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459 (1945) (same); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against a state by its own citizens).
45 See Hess v.' Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,47 (1994) (considering
One Eleventh Amendment's "twin reasons" in concluding that a bi-state compact agency fell
outside the Punendment's protection).
49 Surgical Care Ctr. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. I, 171 F.3c1 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (en
bane) (cautioning against conflating the two doctrines).
5° See Louisiana Power Co' Light, 435 U.S. at 412-13 (relying on Eleventh Amendment
precedent to conclude that cities are not themselves sovereign and that "[in] light of the
serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own paro-
chial interests about the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws ... we are
especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive mu-
nicipal action from their reach").
51 See, e.g., Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 53-54; Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51
("[A]n unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
52 See Federal Trade CO311111 . 11 v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,636 (1992).
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units on the other, the Court had substantial justification for its re-
fusal to extend its implied immunity doctrine beyond policies authori-
tatively adopted for the state as a whole absent any explicit direction
by Congress that it should. As the Court has pointed out: states—not
cities---enjoy sovereign status in our federal system. 53
Surely, the Court was entitled to take account of the fact that the
potential for frustration of federal antitrust policy would be greatly
magnified if the Parker doctrine was extended fully to subordinate
governmental units. As Professor Page has pointed out, the adoption
of anticompetition policies at the state level requires the reconcilia-
tion of a much broader range Of competing interests than typically
would he the case with smaller units of government more focused on
purely parochial concerns or with special purpose governmental enti-
ties, which by their very nature screen out competing interests and
policies." The traditional performance by local and special purpose
governmental entities of a wide range of functions often performed
by private entities also blurs the distinction between government and
private action at the local level. This provides an additional reason for
requiring that anticompetitive conduct be taken pursuant to the di-
rection of a governmental entity exercising statewide authority if fed-
eral antitrust constraints are to be set aside. The Supreme Court had
substantial warrant for concluding that, absent further Congressional
guidance, only state policies of sufficient importance to command the
support of an entity authorized to speak for the state as a whole were
of sufficient weight implicitly to displace the overriding federal anti-
trust norm.
B. Non-retroactivity
A largely unremarked but important premise of the Supreme
Court's state action immunity decisions has been the assumption that
only prospective governmental action is sufficient to invoke the Parker
doctrine.55 In Parker itself, the Court emphasized that "a state does not
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
55 Community ComMI4 nications, 455 U.S. at 53-54.
54 See Page, Merest Groups, supra note 8, at 632-40.
55 A notable exception is Liner Elhauge, who stands alone in recognizing that under
the Supreme Court's decisions, a restraint is entitled to stale action antitrust immunity
only if appropriate slate actors make a substantive decision in favor of the terms of the
challenged restraint befom it is imposed on the market. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 671.
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them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawfitr—a point it
has consistently reiterated in subsequent decisions 58
The Supreme Court has assumed that the justification for limit-
ing the state action doctrine to prospectively adopted anticompetitive
policies is self-evident, as it has never explained the basis for that re-
quirement. Such a limitation no doubt finds its origins in the same
policies that underlie the strong presumption against retrospective
policymaking by both legislatures and administrative agencies. 57 In
particular, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Bonjorno, retrospective policy making may unfairly upset
significant private reliance interests incurred with reference to the law
in effect at the time the conduct at issue took place. 58 The Supreme
Court tightly has assumed that this general non-retroactivity principle
is directly pertinent to fashioning the scope of the implied state action
antitrust immunity doctrine. The retrospective ratification of anti-
competitive private conduct would have the effect of destroying the
justifiable reliance of injured private parties on the prevailing federal
free-competition norm in conducting their business activities and
making investment decisions. 59
56 Compare Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis added), with Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633
(maintaining that a state may not confer immunity on private parties by fiat), and Town of
[lathe, 471 U.S. at 46-47 (stating that a state may not validate a municipality's anticompeti-
tive conduct by declaring it lawful), and Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (stating that "the national
policy in favor of [free] competition cannot he thwarted by casting a gauzy cloak of state
involvement" over private anticompetitive conduct), and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976) (holding that state authorization, encouragement, or approval of
private anticompetitive conduct is insufficient to confer immunity).
57 See, e.g., Landgrilf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("[I]he presump-
tion against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a
legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.") (internal quotation omitted); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. l-iosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (noting, in the context of retrospective
administrative policymaking, that "retroactivity is not favored in the law").
58 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, noted: "It is contrary to fundamental notions of
justice, and thus contrary to realistic assessment of probable legislative intent. The princi-
ple that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed
when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal." 494 U.S. 827, 855
( 1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66 ("Elementary consid-
erations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the
law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly
disrupted.") (citations omitted); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190,
199 (1913) (referring to the reason of "obvious justice" supporting the non-retroactivity
principle).
Elkauge points out that a pre-injury process of disinterested decision making re-
quires financially interested actors to come forward first and provide a realistic assurance
that the restraint is in the public. interest before market injury is suffered. See Mange,
supra note 8, at 714.
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The presumption against legislative retroactivity also is grounded
in the concern that particularized, backward-looking legislation may
arbitrarily discriminate against certain individuals or groups in favor
of powerful private interests, and thus, may be subject to undue
influence by special interests. 60 These concerns are directly pertinent
to determining the scope of the implied state action immunity. Some
critics of current doctrine have suggested that the Supreme Court
should directly focus on the existence of the "capture" of state gov-
ernmental processes by regulated private interests in defining the
scope of Parker immunity.61 Although this view has generated persua-
sive criticism, even the most severe critics of the capture theory have
recognized that the likelihood that a regulatory program reflects the
public interest should be relevant to determining the requirements
for antitrust immunity. 62 For example, Page has argued that the struc-
ture and constraints governing the processes of a state legislature
make the legislature the exclusive source of state anticompetitive pol-
icy entitled to Parker immunity, excluding the policy determinations of
state agencies as well as those of municipalities and other subordinate
governmental bodies.° Although Page justifies this conclusion pri-
marily in terms of what he views as the requirements of political re-
sponsiveness inherent in the "Madisonian process of deliberation," 64
he also contends that because legislatures have a far greater number
of decision makers, virtually unlimited jurisdiction, and are subject to
a. variety of political checks, they will be less subject to capture by
regulated interests than are state agencies.°
Although I disagree with Professor Page's central conclusion that
only legislative policymaking is entitled to Parker immunity, I concur
with his conclusion that the contours of the Supreme Court's state
Go See, e.g., Plant v. Spendthrift Fartn, Inc., 514 U.S. 211. 241-43, 243 n.20 (1095)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that. prospectivity and general applicability provide
assurances against legislative "singling out" or particular favored or disfavored groups);
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266-67 (recognizing that a legislature's responsiveness to political
pressures may tempt it "to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against un-
popular groups Or individuals").
m See Wiley, supra note 8; see also Elhauge, supra note 8, at 695 (arguing that the scope
of immunity should he determined by whether the restraint in question was adopted by a
financially disinterested decisionntaker; "state action immunity applies only when a
financially disinterested state official controls the terms of the challenged restraint").
62 See, e.g., Page, Capture, supra note 8; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8; Spitzer, supra
note 8.
63 See Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8.
61 Id. at 63 1 -32 ,
65 Id. at 635-37.
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action doctrine contain implicit, process-based safeguards designed to
minimize the likelihood that state approval of regulated priVate con-
duct will be directed predominantly to the satisfaction of private ends
rather than to broader conceptions of the public interest. One of
those safeguards is the requirement that anticompetitive private con-
duct must be undertaken pursuant to a generally applicable and pro-
spective policy adopted by a body possessing authority to establish pol-
icy for the state as a whole. The Court's repeated refusal to sanction
the retrospective "ratification" of private anticompetitive conduct af-
ter it already has occurred reflects its recognition that, in such cir-
cumstances, significant practical and political momentum dispropor-
tionately may influence the state's political process to approve what
amounts to a fait accompli. Moreover, because such retrospective
ratifications by definition are not addressed to any general question of
state policy but only to special circumstances involving particularized
private interests already entrenched, the likelihood that the views of
all elements of the state's body politic whose interests might be af-
fected by a more general and prospectively applicable state policy will
be heard and weighed in the balance is diminished significantly. As a
result, the likelihood of a meaningful politicalcheck on state approval
of anticompetitive private conduct is reduced, and the likelihood that
state approval will be obtained correspondingly is increased.
C. General Applicability
A third implicit premise of the Supreme Court's state action hn-
munity decisions is that only a generally applicable state policy is of
sufficient weight to warrant implicit "reverse preemption" of federal
antitrust prohibitions. In Pather itself, the Court made clear that mere
state ratification or authorization of private anticompetitive conduct
was insufficient to confer immunity66—a point that it frequently has
reiterated.67
 Rather, an entity possessing authority to fashion policy for
the state as a whole must have affirmatively addressed and generally
endorsed the specific type of anticompetitive activity at issue.
This premise is most apparent in the Court's municipal action
decisions. By definition, municipalities and other local governmental
entities of limited jurisdiction do not exercise legislative policy-
making authority for the state as a whole. Thus, their undertaking or
endorsement of various types of anticompetitive activities are not in
66 Pruitt% 317 U.S. at 351-52.
See supra note 56.
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themselves entitled to state action immunity unless they have been
authorized by an entity that does In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., for example, the Court held that municipalities that were
alleged to have tied the purchase of electricity to their provision of
water and gas service, and to haVe engaged in other anticompetitive
activities directed to preventing competition by Louisiana Power &
Light CLP&L"), were not entitled to immunity. 68 The Court ex-
plained that "[w] hen cities, each of the same status under state law,
are equally free to approach a policy decision in their own way, the
anticompetitive restraints adopted as policy by any one of them, may
express its own preference rather than that of the State . . . "69
Subsequently, in 1982, in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder; the Court reiterated that policies adopted by cities, even if
authorized by state "home4rule" laws, are not entitled to immunity
because they do not establish a generally applicable policy for the
state as a whole." The Court reasoned that granting immunity in such
circumstances would permit one city to regulate cable television com-
petition, another to prescribe monopoly service, and yet another to
pursue free-market competition: The Court stated: "Acceptance of
such a proposition—that the general grant of power to enact ordi-
nances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anti-
competitive ordinances—would wholly eviscerate the concepts of
`clear articulation and affirtnative expression' that our precedents re-
quire."71 In short, even state-authorized local declarationS of local pol-
icy are not entitled to state action immunity because they are not
authoritative state, declarations of a policy generally applicable to the state
as a whole.
Of course, one may disagree, as many have done, on the ground
that denial of antitrust immunity to state authorized adoptions of lo-
cal policies unduly constrains the ability of state governments to alto=
cate governmental decision-making to local governmental units in an
efficient and politically responsive way. 72 But, given the strong na-
tional policy established by the federal antitrust laws and the Constitu-
tional supremacy of federal law Within its appointed sphere, as well as
the absence of any express provision authorizing the "reverse preemp-
tion" of federal antitrust law by the states, the Supreme Court was on
6° 435 U.S. at 389.
69 Id. at 414-15.
7° See 455 U.S. at 55-56.
71 Id.
72
 See supra notes 40-41.
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firm ground when it concluded that only generally applicable anti-
competitive policies of statewide authoritativeness are of sufficient
weight to justify an assumption that Congress had no intention to sub-
ject them to the facially unqualified national pro-competition norm.
One could equally argue (as few have done) that general state
authorizations to private actors in particular industries to engage in
anticompetitive activities should be accorded antitrust immunity on
the ground that a state may conclude that certain segments of its
economy will operate most efficiently if they are freed from competi-
tive constraints. This argument, however, does not directly address the
question of whether ari implied inverse preemption based on as-
sumed Congressional intent is appropriate for such general delega-
tions of authority to private actors. As the Court itself repeatedly has
emphasized, only states, not private actors, and not local governmen-
tal units, are sovereign entities in our federal system. For that reason,
only substantive policies explicitly adopted for the state as a whole are
entitled to the respect that Parker's implied inverse preemption doc-
trine confers. 73 •
Like the Supreme. Court's implicit requirement of prospectivity,
the recognition of state action immunity only for a statewide policy of
general applicability provides a structural safeguard ensuring that ex-
ceptions to the federally prescribed pro-competition norm are
sufficiently weighty to attract the support of an entity authorized to
prescribe policy for the state as a whole. Unlike particularized
ratifications or approvals of specific proposals for private anticompeti-
tive action, generalized policy prescriptions are likely to engender the
opposition of all interests affected by such an anticompetitive state
policy—and thus, are less likely to be adopted. The requirement that
Parker immunity may be accorded only to statewide policies of general
applicability therefore serves to minimize departures from the federal
competitive norm.
D. Specificity
The Supreme Court has struggled to define how specifically a
state must approve particular anticompetitive conduct if it is to be
73 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 412 (stating that under our dual system
of government, "`states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority'" (quoting Parket; 317 U.S. at 351) and that lc] ides are not them-
selves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create
them").
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immune from the federal antitrust laws since it first announced the
two-pronged clear articulation and active supervision test in Midcal
Aluminum in 1980. The Court's answers have been both inconsistent
with each other and with the stated basis for imposing the require-
ments at all.
In cases where the state's regulatory program has involved private
anticompetitive activities claimed to have been undertaken pursuant
to state policy, the Court has insisted not only that an entity author-
ized to formulate policy for the state as a whole have endorsed the
particular type of anticompetitive conduct at issue but also that all of
the details of the private arrangement actually have been reviewed
and approved by a state actor. For example, in Patrick v. Burget,74 the
Court rejected a claim of antitrust immunity for Oregon's system of
medical peer review, finding state statutes that clearly articulated a
general state policy in favor of medical peer review insufficient to
meet Midcat s "rigorous two-pronged test" for attributing private anti-
competitive action to the state. 75 The Court held that the active su-
pervision requirement additionally must be satisfied "to ensure that
the state-action doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually further state
regulatory policies."76 The presence of some state monitoring or in-
volvement was insufficient. Rather, "[s]tate officials [must] have and
exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private par-
ties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." 77
In FederalTrade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.," the Court
held that state "negative option" schemes for regulating the rates set
for title searches and examinations by private rating bureaus were not
entitled to immunity because the states had not determined the
"specifics" of the rates actually set. 79 Satisfaction of the clear articula-
tion prong, by itself, was insufficient because "it cannot alone ensure,
as required by our precedents, that particular anticompetitive con-
duct has been approved by the State."" It was not sufficient that the
states in question had created a state regulatory program, which was
staffed and funded and granted state officials the power and duty to
74 486 U.S. at 94.
76 Id. at 100.
76 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
77 Id.
78 504 U.S. at 621.
79 Id. at 629, 638.
8° Id. at 637.
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regulate pursuant to declared general standards of state policy. 81 The
Court's more demanding standard ensured that the states would "ac-
cept political responsibility for the actions they intend to under-
take. "82
The Court's decisions with respect to municipal action have
taken a markedly different course. Only three years after rejecting a
claim of immunity for actions taken by the City of Boulder under a
broad grant of "home rule authority,"83 the Court made an abrupt
about face in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. 84 In that case, the
Court watered down the clear articulation requirement to the vanish-
ing point and dispensed with the active supervision requirement alto-
gether.85
 Municipal action was antitrust-immune if it was the "foresee-
able result" of state authority to act in a particular area, without any
requirement that the details of the city's implementation of state pol-
icy receive any supervision at al1. 88
 Thus, the City of Eau Claire's policy
of tying its sewerage treatment services to the provision of collection
and transportation services was immune because it was the "foresee-
able result" of state statutes authorizing the city to operate sewage sys-
tems and determine the areas to be served. 87
The Court's newly relaxed clear articulation requirement effec-
tively dispensed with any requirement that state authorization to en-
gage in particular types of anticompetitive conduct actually be "clear"
in the case of municipal actors. At the same time, the Court's elimina-
tion of the rigorous active supervision requirement applicable to pri-
vate actors left the "specific details" of anticompetitive municipal ac-
tion entirely within the discretion of the municipality itself. As the
Hallie "foreseeability" test has been applied by the courts of appeals, it
has proven to have essentially no bite, leading to the conclusion that
the broader the delegation of authority to act with respect to a par-
ticular subject matter, the more likely that anticompetitive conduct
will be held to be the foreseeable result of that delegation. 88 This re-
81 Id.
82 Id. at 636.
83 Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 55.
61 471 U.S. at 34.
83
 See id. at 45-47.
88 Id. at 42.
87
 Id. at 42, 47.
go See, e.g., C. DOUGLAS FLOYD E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS:
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF CIVIL ANTITRUST LITIGATION § 4.1.7 (1996); Elltattge,
supra note 8, at 691-92; Garland, supra note 8; Gifford, supra note 8, at 1244; jorde, supra
note 8, at 242, 244.
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stilt seems utterly inconsistent with the holding of Community Commu-
nications Co. v. City of Boulder that a general delegation of municipal
home rule authority cannot satisfy the clear articulation requirement
or Hallie's foreseeability test.89 The Supreme Court has not explained
why, if a clear articulation of sovereign state policy is required to en-
sure that the actions of non-sovereign units of local government are in
accordance with that policy, the requirement should be interpreted in
a way that makes it impossible for it to achieve that goal. This weak
interpretation of the clear articulation requirement has led to strenu-
ous efforts by both of the antitrust enforcement agencies of the
United States government to reformulate the test to impose some
meaningful constraint on the ability of non-state actors to engage in
iticompetitive activity. 90
Critics of the Court's ostensibly rigorous two-pronged approach
to the state action immunity doctrine have applauded Hallie's appar-
ent evisceration of those requirements in the context of anticompeti-
tive municipal action on the ground that those restraints frustrate the
goals both of economic efficiency and federalism. Thus, William Page
has argued that the active supervision requirement—whether applied
to private or municipal conduct—is misguided because it imposes a
costly system of centralized "command and control" regulation on the
states which may be economically inefficient. 91
 He further argues,
presumably on the same grounds, that the clear articulation require-
ment should be satisfied whenever the legislature clearly articulates its
intention that the competitive market should not be relied upon to
make output and pricing decisions, even though the details of the
regulatory regime are left entirely at large. 92 Judge Easterbrook simi-
larly contends that heavily supervised regulation may not promote
allocative efficiency. Instead, be maintains that unsupervised exit
competition among local governments will lead to more efficient
regulation. He asks why federalism should not require the Court to
accept the states' decisions to allocate power to local governments. 93
Hovenkamp and MacKerron suggest that a state's decision to delegate
broad and unsupervised regulatory power to local governmental units
99 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g, Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen, Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1442-
43 (9th Cir. 1997); Federal Trade COM111'11 v. liopital Bd. of Dirs., 38 F.3d 1184, 1188,
1190 (11th Cir. 1994).
91 Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1101, 1129.
92 See Page, Intrust Groups, supra note 8, at 643-44.
99 See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 29, 30, 32-33, 36-37, 41.
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should be respected in the interests of federalism and economic
efficiency unless the 1661 governmental unit is not the "optimal eco-
nomic regulator" of the particular activity in question (because, for
example, it generates spillover effects). In such a case, both clear ar-
ticulation and active supervision of its activities by the state should be
required."
Professor Wiley argues that the clear articulation and active su-
pervision requirements represent "a miserable procedural compro-
mise to the substantive problem of antitrust federalism: as applied, it
not only insults the value of state and local sovereignty but also fails to
advance federal economic policy."95
 In his view, the Court should ei-
ther "abandon the clear-statement rule altogether and revive the
genuine deference to state sovereignty that Parker exhibited or else
adopt a review of state and local regulation that focuses more selec-
tively on the problem of regulatory capture" by economically inter-
ested private parties. 96 Thomas Jorde similarly welcomes the Court's
relaxation of these requirements in Hallie, claiming that Midcar s rig-
orous two-pronged approach was contrary to principles of "economic
federalism" because it limited the states' ability to delegate economic
decision making to agencies, municipalities, or private individuals 9 7
Einer Elhauge believes that the clear articulation and active supervi-
sion requirements should be jettisoned in favor of an approach fo-
cused directly on whether the decision in question was made by a
"financially interested decision maker" and that both the articulation
and supervision requirements are contrary to the interest in local
autonomy."
With the exception of Elhauge's suggestion of a focus on whether
the restraint in question was the product of a "financially interested
decision maker," these arguments fail to explain the Court's distinc-
tion between private and municipal action, which requires state ap-
proval of the specific details of a private restraint but only the most
general authorization of power to deal with a particular subject matter
in the case of municipalities." Rather, they suggest the elimination of
the requirements altogether, both for private and municipal action.
This is a course that the Court steadfastly has declined to pursue. The
Hoven kainp & MacKerron, supra note 8, at 724, 751, 765, 774-75.
95 Wiley, supra note 8, at 715.
96 Id.
97 ionic, supra note 8, at 236-37, 241.
" Mange, supra note 8, at 674-76, 692-95.
Jorde, supra note 8, al 244.
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general commendation of Hallie thus rests less on principle than on
the view that "half a loaf' is better than none.
In fact, neither principles of federalism nor those of economic
efficiency can justify either the Court's general approach to the Parker
doctrine or the widely disparate treatment that it has accorded to the
anticompetitive conduct of municipal and private actors. As previously
discussed, the ideal of federalism does not suggest that the important
national policy in favor of free competition should be implicitly over-
ridden by local municipal decisions that have not been endorsed by
an authorized policy maker for the state as a whole. And, as others
have recognized, the Court's Parker decisions are not aimed at achiev-
ing economic efficiency, but rather, at allowing the states to adopt
demonstrably anticompetitive policies when they have clearly deter-
mined to depart from the federal competitive norm. 100
The Court's own explanation for its divergent treatment of mu-
nicipal and private conduct is just as lacking as those based on con-
cepts of federalism and economic efficiency. In Hallie, the Court sug-
gested that the active supervision requirement was intended to ensure
that the actor was in fact implementing a general anti-competition
policy previously articulated by the state. In the case of private actors,
that safeguard was required because "where a private party is engag-
ing in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is act-
ing to further his own interests, rather than the governmental inter-
ests Of the State." 101 By contrast:
Where the actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger
that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The
only real danger is that it will seek to further purely paro-
chial public interests at the expense of more overriding state
goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the re-
quirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy. 102
This passage, which has been uncritically accepted by subsequent
decisions and commentators, seems to ignore the fact that municipali-
ties, as much as private actors, are "persons" subject to antitrust
IN See generally Garland, supra note 8; Page, Antitrust, supra note 8; Page, Capture, supra
note 8; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8.
101 Town of Hanle, 471 U.S. at 47.
102 Id.
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laws." This very fact reflects an implicit Congressional judgment that
municipalities, no less than private actors, may have strong incentives
to engage in anticompetitive conduct that has the same—or poten-
tially even greater—adverse impact on free market competition than
the conduct of private actors. To say that municipalities therefore may
be "trusted" more than private actors to further public interests ar-
ticulated by the state" ignores Congress's determination that mu-
nicipalities and other local units of government present a significant
risk of anticompetitiVe conduct in their own right.
The Supreme Court recognized this fact in City of Lafayette v. Lou-
isiana Power & Light Co., when it rejected automatic application of the
.Parker doctrine to municipal action." The Court explained that "the
economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of
their business affairs, designed ... to assure maximum benefits for
the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to com-
port with the broader interests of national economic well-being than
are those of private corporations . ."106 The Court quite correctly
recognized that "when these bodies act as owners and providers of
services, they are fully capable of aggrandizing other economic units
with which they interrelate with the potential of serious distortion of
the rational and efficient allocation of resources and the efficiency of
free markets which the regime of competition embodied in the anti-
trust Jaws is thought to engender. " 107 This conclusion draws further
support from the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions which con-
sistently have refused to equate local governmental units with the
state in major part because, both in historic origin and in the nature
of many activities they undertake, municipalities are similar to private
business corporations."
The Court's different treatment of municipal and private actors is
better explained by a focus on the locus of state law policy-making
with respect to the issue at hand, than by increased "trust" in the good
acts and intentions of municipal actors measured on a pro-
competition scale. By definition, private actors are not vested with
authority to determine state policy, either in general or in its specific
1°5
 See Comtnunity Communications, 455 U.S. at 56; Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
at 394-95.
104 See Town of Hattie, 471 U.S. at 47.
1°5
 See 435 U.S. at 389.
1°6 Id. at 403.
107 Id. at 408.
108
 See supta 1 low 45.
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detail. The situation of municipalities and other local governmental
bodies is much different. The clear articulation requirement, applied
hi a meaningful way, assures that particular types of anticompetitive
conduct undertaken by municipal bodies reflect the policy of the state
as a whole. By necessity, however, a state-wide anticompetitive policy
must focus on broad types of anticompetitive conduct and their ne-
cessity or desirability to the achievement of the state's regulatory
goals, rather than on the details of particular transactions of the
authorized kind. Conversely, local governmental bodies have no
authority to determine policy for the entire state. They are, however,
vested with state law authority to determine the specific details of state
policy in its actual implementation in particular transactions within
their limited jurisdiction once those transactions have been clearly
authorized by a state-wide policy maker in advance. Thus, the dispen-
sation granted to local governmental units from the active supervision
requirement of current immunity doctrine simply reflects the scope
of their policymaking authority with respect to inherently local mat-
ters as a matter of state law.
Consider the terms of an exclusive dealing arrangement entered
by a local hospital authority.'° Provided that a state legislature or
other actor authorized to determine policy for the state as a whole has
articulated sufficiently a general policy permitting such exclusive ar-
rangements, there is no reason to insist that the state legislature also
approve the specific determination of when such authority should be
invoked or what the terms of its exercise should be. Such a require-
ment would be wholly impracticable and would ignore the very rea-
son why the state has chosen to delegate authority to implement the
specific details of state policy to lOcal hospital districts.
In short,• rather than view municipalities as occupying a special
position making them "exempt" from the active supervision require-
ment, it would be better to view both the clear articulation and active
supervision requirements as dual components of a single overarching
I°9 See, e.g., Crosby v. Hospital Audi., 93 17.3d 1515 (11111 Cir. 1996) (holding statutory
authorization for hospital authorities to deny staff privileges on the basis of training, expe-
rience, competence, availability and "reasonable objectives, including, but not limited to,
the appropriate utilization of hospital facilities," make it foreseeable that staff privileges
would he denied based on a determination that the existing staff was sufficient to satisfy
demand for the specially in question); Martin v. Memorial Hosp., 86 1.7.3d 1391, 1400 (5111
Cir. 1996) (holding statute authorizing municilml hospital to contract with may individual
to provide services regarding any facet of the operation of the hospital, coupled with state
certificate of need law, made entry of exclusive contract for the provision of renal services
at the hospital foreseeable).
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principle that anticompetitive conduct falls within the state action ex-
emption from the antitrust laws only if it is approved in advance and
in specific detail by public authorities having the power to (1) formu-
late a general policy in favor of such anticompetitive arrangements for
the state as a whole and (2) determine that the specific contract or
arrangement in question falls within that policy. A single body could
in some instances exercise both functions simultaneously. As discussed
below, this may be true with respect to tariff approval and other ac-
tions commonly undertaken by state public utilities commissions and
other state agencies exercising state-wide jurisdiction. In such cases,
the two-pronged Midcal test becomes irrelevant.
Frequently, however, the combination of both functions in a sin-
gle body is neither desirable not; as a practical matter, possible. In
that event, provided that a general policy authorizing the kind of an-
ticompetitive conduct at issue previously has been adopted by the
state legislature or other body having state law authority to determine
policy for the state as a whole, the more limited sphere of authority
exercised by municipalities and other local and special purpose gov-
ernmental bodies is more than sufficient to permit them to determine
the specifics of state policy. Thus, if a municipality enters an exclusive
dealing or other potentially anticompetitive arrangement pursuant to
a general policy previously articulated by a state-wide policymaker, its
actions are exempt, not because it can be "trusted" to act in the way
the legislature contemplated, but rather, because the municipality it-
self is the authorized repository of state power to determine the
specifics of state policy in its particular applications.
This way of looking at the question also helps to explain why, for
example,' municipalities and other subordinate .governmental bodies
consistently have been held to have the authority to perform the ac-
tive supervision requirement with respect to particular conduct un-
dertaken by private actors pursuant to a policy previously articulated
by the state legislature. 110
 If the state legislature or state supreme
court alone could formulate "state policy," the result would be anoma-
lous because the approval of a state agency, municipality, or other
110 See, e.g., Sou1hern Motor Carries, 971 U.S. at 63; California CNC, Inc. v. Southern Cal.
Gas Co., 96 F.3d 1193, 1203 (9th Cir. 1996); Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64
F.3d 600, 612 (11 th Cir. 1995). But see Riverview Inn's:, Inc. v. Ottawa Cinty. Improvement
Corp., 774 F.2d 162, 163 (6th Cir. 1985) (altering earlier order and instructing district
court to determine on remand whether the state—as opposed to the city—had actively
supervised a private defendant's conduct pursuant to municipal regulation); City Com-
1111111kii I/0/15, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 660 F. Stipp. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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subordinate governmental unit would do nothing to ensure that the
specific details of the private action in question had indeed been ap-
proved by the state. By recognizing that state law policy making
authority is divided among various units of government and that the
intended and legitimate purpose of restricted jurisdiction units of
state government is to formulate the specific details of state policy in
its actual application, the twin clear articulation and active supervi-
sion components of the Supreme Court's Parker decisions give ample
recognition to practical and political legitimacy of the delegation of
state governmental powers.
This analysis Suggests that the longstanding and widespread criti-
cism of the Court's Parker doctrine on the ground that it fails to rec-
ognize the legitimate need for delegation of state powers to subordi-
nate governmental agencies is misguided. 111 At the same time, it
suggests that the Court's general "foreseeability" standard for satisfac-
tion of the clear articulation requirement as it has developed in the
lower courts under Hallie is,subject to substantial criticism and should
be reexamined. 1 P In effect, this approach negates the Court's re-
quirement that a body such as the state legislature possessing policy
making authority for the state as a whole have made an affirmative
decision to permit a particUlar type of anticompetitive conduct in the
area in question. For this reason, much can be said in the cases involv-
ing municipal and private actors for attempts by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice to introduce 'a greater de-
gree of rigor to the clear articulation inquiry)"
As pointed out below, howeVer, the situation of state agencies is
much different. Unlike local or special purpose governmental units,
state agencies do possess policymaking authority for the state as a
whole. For that reason, a more liberal interpretation of the clear ar-
ticulation requirement to encompass state agency approval of particu-
lar types of anticompetitive conduct that are within the scope of a
-broad delegation of policymaking authority to-the agency by the state
legislature or state constitution is entirely appropriate.
In See supra notes 39-42.
112 In an important recent en bane decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has begun that trend, recognizing' that an "(wetly lax view of the necessity of expressed
legislative will" undermines the interests of federalism. Su'rgical Care Center of Hammond, 171
F.3c1 at 236.
113 See mina note 90.
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E. 'Visibility and Political Control
Professor William Page has been the most forceful advocate of
the position that, based on principles of "Madisonian democracy,"
only the policy decisions of a state legislature or state supreme court
"count" for the purposes of the Parker immunity doctrine.'" He con-
tends—erroneously, in my view—that the Supreme Court's decisions
defining the scope of the Parker doctrine have focused fundamentally
on the "process of representation" and that the Court's decisions are
best explained as a reflection of the "Madisonian model of represen-
tative government."" 5
 In his view, only the actions of a state legislature
matter for Parker purposes because "[t] he Madisonian concept of rep-
resentative government presupposes a reconciliation of interests dur-
ing an enactment process that involves logrolling and compromise" in
the state legislature." 6
 The delegation of regulatory decisions to state
agencies, however, "removes the Madisonian system of electoral
checks and balances" from policy development, and thus, deprives
those decisions of sufficient legitimacy to support a Parker immunity
claim. 117
 "Theory and experience teach that, when the legislature has
transferred responsibility for central policy chOices to a regulatory
agency under a broad delegation of power, the presumption of popu-
lar consent to protective regulation is unwarranted.”iis
In a later article, Page elaborated on this theme, asserting that a
state's decision to displaCe the antitrust laws can be made only after
"competing interest groups have survived the traditional Madisonian
gauntlet of legislative procedures."" 9 He further argued that the Su-
preme Court has required that anticompetitive policy be articulated
by the state legislature because of its "increased awareness of the po-
litical shortcomings of the regulatory process."12° Page contends that
"regulators typically are not directly responsive to the chief executive,
just as they are not responsible to the electorate." Furthermore, Page
opines that legislatures reflect a greater range of interests than regula-
tory agencies and are less likely to be captured by directly affected
economic interests. 121 In this connection, he argues that the Supreme
114 See Page, Antitrust, supra note 8; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8.
115 Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1101,1107.
11 ° Id. at 1111 (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 1112.
118 Id. at 1113.
119 Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 619.
120 Id, at 621.
121 See id. at 634-35.
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Court's requirement for a clear articulation of state anticompetition
policy is not a "proxy for the ultimate issue of legislative intent," but
rather, "has the independent function of guaranteeing that legislative
intent is expressed in a way that ensures adequate information in the
political process."122
Page's attempt to cast the antitrust state action doctrine into a
Madisonian model .that would have been familiar to the Framers of
the Constitution draws little support from the decisions of the Su-
preme Court and misapprehends the basis and origins of the clear
statement requirement. 123 The Supreme Court's Parker immunity de-
cisions evidence far more concern with the formal locus of state poli-
cymaking authority on an issue than with concepts of Madisonian
democracy derived from the Federalist Papers. For example, in Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court denied immunity for the action of
the state bar in enforcing locally adopted fee schedules. 124 Noting that
the Court recognized the status of the bar as an administrative agency
of the state for limited purposes, Page argues that Goldfarb supports
his attempted restriction of Parker to the actions of the state legisla-
ture. 125 In fact, Goldfarb contains no mention of the necessity of direct
legislative control of state policy or of concepts of Madisonian democ-
racy as the fount of the Poker doctrine. Rather, the Court's opinion,
which was issued before its subsequent decisions bad crystallized the
Parker doctrine in its current form and clarified that state compulsion
is not a requirement for antitrust immunity, is most fairly read as re-
jecting the claim of immunity in Goldfarb because the Virginia Su-
preme Court was the entity authorized by state law to regulate the
practice of law and, far from compelling the use of binding fee
schedules, explicitly had directed lawyers not to be controlled by
them. 126 The Court's opinion was focused on the formal locus of state
law authority with respect to fee schedules in the Virginia Supreme
Court. It does not hold that a state administrative agency never may
adopt Parker-immune anticompetition policy for the state. 127
122 Id. at 640; see also Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 8 (focusing at various points on
the importance of political participation and arguing that the Court now uses a process-
oriented approach that enhances political participation by requiring anticompetitive poli-
cies to he clearly authorized by the state legislature).
123 See infra notes 254-259 and accompanying text.
124 421 U.S. at 773.
125 See Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1116-17.
126 421 U.S. at 789-90.
127 See infra notes 159-168 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's decisions in Bates v. State Bar 128 and Hoover
Ronwin 129
 similarly evidence no concern with the process of direct
representation or Madisonian concepts of representative democracy.
hi those cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the actions of the
state supreme court in restricting lawyer advertising and regulating
admission to the bar were antitrust immune. In Bates, the members of
the Arizona Supreme Court were subject to a periodic, non-political
"retention" election. 1" However, the United States Supreme Court
placed no emphasis on that fact in holding that the state supreme
court's actions were ipso facto antitrust immune. Rather, the Court fo-
cused on the formal locus of statewide authority with respect to the
regulatory matters at issue.'" Similarly, in Hoover, the Supreme Court
did not focus on direct political responsiveness or Madisonian con-
cepts of representative self government, but rather, on the fact that
under the Arizona Constitution the "Arizona Supreme Court has ple-
nary authority to determine admissions to the bar." 132 In exercising its
legislative power pursuant to that authority, it "occupies the same po-
sition as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state su-
preme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from
Sherman Act liability as state action." 133
For the purpose of Parker immunity, there is no persuasive basis
for distinguishing state supreme courts acting in their "legislative ca-
pacity" with respect to the regulation of the bar from the actions of a
state agency acting "legislatively" with respect to matters within its
statewide jurisdiction and authority. In either event, each is the
authorized policymaker for the state with respect to the matter in
question. 134
 Even in states where members of the judiciary are subject
128 433 U.S. at 350.
129 466 U.S. at 558.
198 See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 38.
131
 The Court stated: "In the instant case ... the challenged restraint is the affirmative
command of the Arizona Supreme Court under its Rules 27(a) and 29(a) and its Discipli-
nary Rule 2-101(B). That court is the ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of
law ." Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-60 (emphasis added).
132 Hoover; 466 U.S. at 569.
133
 Id. at 568.
134 Although state supreme courts, unlike most agencies, have independent constitu-
tional authority to regulate the practice of law, they also typically exercise substantial regu-
latory authority with respect to the practice of law delegated to them by tile state legisla-
ture. See, e.g., In reAttorney Discipline System; Requests of the Governor and the State Bar
of California, 967 P.2d 49 (Cal. 1998). Courts have upheld such legislative regulation of
the practice of law if it is reasonable and not in material conflict with the supreme court's
iiiherent authority. See id. at 60-61; see also Note, The Inherent Power of theJudiciary to Regulate
the Practice of Law—A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783,802 (1976). In implement-
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to periodic retention or contested elections, those elections are more
likely to focus on the justices' performance of their judicial duties,
rather than their legislative and administrative duties with respect to
the regulation of the bar. 135 Moreover, recognition of immunity for
the legislative policy prescriptions of state supreme courts is inconsis-
tent with the central premise of Page's position—that the actions of
state legislatures are to be preferred to those of state agencies in the
Parker immunity calculus because the state legislature offers a forum
for the reconciliation of a much broader range of competing interests
and therefore is more likely to reflect the broader public interest. In
their regulation of the bar, state supreme courts frequently may
reflect a narrower range of interests than many economic, environ-
mental, and social regulatory agencies of the state.
Only a few of the Supreme Court's Parker opinions have alluded
to considerations of political visibility and representation of the kind
discussed by Page. Those references have been both fleeting and am-
biguous in their implications."6 In Town of Hallie, for example, in
ing legislatively prescribed regulation of the bar, state supreme courts exercise a function
indistinguishable from that of administrative agencies generally.
M See generally John 8:Wang, State Supreme Court Justices: tilts Are They?, 32 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 49, 71-72 . 0997) (concluding that state supreme court justices are selected by ap-
pointment in nine states, by partisan election in ten states, by non-partisan election in 16
states, and by a "mixed" process in 15 states); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick,]. Keenan, Judges
and the Politics of Death: Deciding beturen the Bill of Rig-his and the Next Election in Capital Cases,
75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 776-78 (1995) (concluding that state supreme court justices are sub-
ject to contested elections, either partisan or non-partisan, in 29 slates at some point in
their careers, and that justices in 13 states are at some time subjected to a retention elec-
tion without an opponent).
"6 In Allied Tube & Conduit onp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), the Su-
preme Court, in the course of rejecting a claim of "petitioning" immunity tinder the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine for the anticompetitive effect that standards adopted by a private stan-
dard setting organization had in the market of their own force, adopted an ambiguous
"context and nature" lest for determining the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity. Id. at
505. In assessing the "context and nature" of the petitioning activities at issue ill Allied
Tube, the Court noted that they had been directed at a private organization rather than a
governmental hotly, and that unlike a governmental body, "no official authority has been
conferred on [the association] by any government ...." Id. at 501. The Court went on to
slate that "where,.as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public
and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restrain-
ing competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has resulted from pri-
vate action." Id. at 502. To the extent that Nom' and Parker immunities are viewed as "com-
plementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not
politics," City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991),
the Court's decision in Allied Tube is entirely consistent with a focus on the locus of official
policymaking authority in determining the scope of the Parker doctrine. Indeed, Omni's
ultimate rejection of any exception to either Parker or Noerr inumuthy for actions taken by
governmental officials pursutun to an anticon petitive "conspiracy" with private parties, id.
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holding that active supervision of municipal action is not required to
obtain Parker immunity, the Court primarily reasoned that unlike pri-
vate actors, municipal actors are presumed to act in the public inter-
est and present "little or no danger that [they are] involved in a pri-
vate price-fixing arrangement." 137
 In a footnote, the Court noted that
municipal conduct is more likely to be exposed to public scrutiny
than private conduct through the operation of "sunshine" and public
disclosure regulations and that "municipal officers, unlike corporate
heads, are checked to some degree through the electoral process. Such a
position in the public eye may provide some greater protection
against antitrust abuses than exists for private parties." 38
These observations in the context of municipal immunity hardly
support the view that only a state legislature that is directly responsi-
ble to the electorate can adopt Parker-immune antitrust policy for the
state. Indeed, the municipal action cases present one of the greatest
difficulties for those who would explain the Court's state action doc-
trine in terms of direct political accountability because the Court has
never extended absolute immunity to the policy determinations of
local governmental bodies despite substantial arguments that smaller
units of local government are more representative and responsible to
the electorate than larger units of govermnent."9
One of the most frequent refrains among critics of the Court's
• elaboration of the Parker doctrine has been that its failure to extend
immunity to the actions of local governmental units free from the re-
quirement of a prior clear articulation of policy at the state level im-
properly impairs the values of federalism that the doctrine was in-
at 374-75, 382-83, is inconsistent with a view of Parker immunity as turning essentially on
direct political responsiveness to the electorate.
"7 471 U.S. at 45, 47.
"8 Id. at 45 n.9 (emphasis added).
"9
 Page recognizes that municipalities pose a problem for his theory, but attempts to
justify their treatment on the ground that they do not reflect as wide a range of interests as
the state legislature. Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 639. Inman and Rubinfeld simi-
larly argue that illIMUnily should turn significantly on the federalism value of political
participation, but recognize that this approach creates problems in explaining die restric-
tive treatment of municipal action in view of the fact that small units of government are
presumptively more politically responsive to the electorate than larger units. See Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 1214-15, 1223, 1232, 1255-56. Their attempted reconciliation
turns on the argument that the requirement for clear articulation by a state legislature
ensures that unrepresented interests affected by economic spill-overs will be represented
in the "original agreement" to permit anticompetitive actions. See id. at 1257. This fails to
explain, however, why supervision of municipal action is not required to ensure that the
bargain is kept. See id.
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tended to promote. 14° As previously discussed, I regard this criticism
as misplaced. It does illustrate, though, that the Supreme Court has
not seen visibility and direct political accountability as the hinge on
which Parker immunity should turn."'
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the Court re-
jected the contention that direct responsiveness to the electorate pro-
vides the key to unlocking the Parker doctrine. 142 The Court rejected a
claim of immunity in that case because of the lack of a clear articula-
tion of statewide policy on the matter in question and dismissed the
argument that municipal action should be immune "because the gov-
ernment is subject to political control, [and] the welfare of its citizens
is assured through the political process ...." 143 The presence of eco-
nomic spillovers relied on by some commentators to explain the re-
quirement for clear articulation of anticompetition policy by the state
in that case144 fails to capture the essential thrust of the Court's rea-
soning, which was that the direct accountability of municipal actors to
the electorate was not a sufficient foundation for Parker immunity for
anticompetitive municipal action, whether or not that conduct in-
volved spillovers on unrepresented consumers."5
1111 See, e.g., fltwenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 8, at 774-75; see aiso jorde, supra
note 8, 236-37, 248; Wiley, supra note 8, 715.
141 jorde also argues that the scope of Parker immunity should turn in significant de-
gree on the "citizen participation value" of federalism. Seejorde, supra note 8, at 229. lie
does not argue, however; that this value requires the direct political representation charac-
teristic of the slate legislature as a condition of immunity. See id. To the contrary, he argues
that the federalism basis of Parker suggests that immunity should extend more broadly to
the decisions both of municipalities and state agencies than a strict interpretatiolt of the
clear articulation requirement would permit, and that the "value of citizen participation is
served by opportunities for affected interests to participate in the regulatory process and
supervision of agencies by the state legislature in the process of budget review. See id. at
227-28, 242-43, 249-50. Elhattge argues that the Court's current Parker doctrine is "poorly
tailored to promoting citizen participation" and contends that the question instead should
turn on whether the restraint at issue was imposed by a financially interested decision
maker. See Elliange, supra note 8, at 071, 678. Although he leaves the question whether the
financially disinterested decision maker also must. be "politically accountable" unresolved,
his discussion of state agencies makes clear that lie does not believe that the direct political
accountability characteristic of a state legislature is required. See id. at 689-90, 703-04,
738-46.
142 435 U.S. at 389.
"3 ht. at 405-06.
liovenkamp & MacKerron, supra note 8, at 775-76 & n.92.
145 As Inman and Rubinfeld recognize, their emphasis on the political participation
value of federalism in explaining the contours of the Parker doctrine implies that local
regulations that affect only local residents must be approved only locally. See Inman &
Rithinfeld, supra note 8, at 1266. This position has consistently been rejected by the Su-
preme Court.
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Moreover, recent scholarship calls into question the simplified
premises on which the Madisonian model of direct representative
democracy rests. The implicit premises of the Madisonian model are
that legislatures represent a broader range of interests, are less subject
to influence by special interests, and are more politically accountable
than unelected "bureaucrats." 146
 Today, none of these premises may
be true. While admittedly much work remains to be done regarding
the characteristics of state administrative and legislative processes," 7
studies of both federal and state agencies and legislatures suggest that
legislatures may be equally or more subject to special interest
influence and narrow focus than are agencies themselves." 8 This may
result from the prevalent phenomenon of "logrolling" in the legisla-
tive process"9
 and from the common practice of delegating key legis-
lative decisions to committees or subcommittees subject to the domi-
nation of one or several powerful chairs or committee members.
These committees and subcommittees may be more susceptible than
the legislature as a whole to special interest domination. 150 Moreover,
agencies frequently may be influenced to reach decisions that serve a
wide range of interests—including consumer interests—not just those
of the regulated industry.lm This result is promoted by the expansion
1A6 Page, Antitrust, supra note 8; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 630-33.
147 Ira Sharkansky, State Administraton in the Political Process, in Pouncs IN THE AMERI-
CAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 238, 240 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds.,
1971) (noting that we have only superficial knowledge about the functioning of state ad-
ininistrat ive agencies in the policymaking process).
148 Wiley, supra note 8, 724-25 (arguing that legislatures are equally likely to be cap-
tured by special interests as are agencies).
149 Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 1234.
150 See GLENN ABNEY & THOMAS P. LAUTH, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND CITY GOVERN-
MENT 82 (1986); WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 57 (1967)
(observing that at the legislative committee level, industry pressure can be overwhelming);
Harold 11 : Bruff & Ernest Gellborn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1379 (1977); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by
Regulation, BELLI ECON. & MGIv•r. Sci. 22, 43-44 (Spring 1971); Abraham I). Sofaer,Judi-
eial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293,
1306 (1972) (commenting that the arguments that agencies are subject to pressure by
special interest groups are overstated, "especially if that leads to the proposition that the
legislative branch is any better itt these respects"); Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare,
57 U. Ctn. L. REv. 335, 341 (1990); Richard B. Stewart, The &formation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HA RV. L. REv. 1669, 1695-1696 (1975).
151 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 207, 244 (1984) thereinafter Bruff, Legislative Formality] (stating: "Long-held theories
that agencies become t he captives of their regulated industries no longer seem true, if they
ever were, in light of such developments as expanded agency jurisdictions that cover many
industries, the rise of 'public interest' groups, and widespread participation in the admin-
istrative process"); William Gormley, Policy Dilemmas in a Political Context, in STATE POLITICS
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of direct and indirect interest representation in agency proceedings
and by judicial review. 152 In addition, agencies are subject to the safe-
guards of public hearings, in both their adjudicatory and rulemaking
activities. 153 Moreover, considerable evidence refutes the conclusion
that agencies are not politically accountable for their policy making
decisions. Not only are a number of agencies subject to direct popular
election, 151 but those that are not are subject to substantial influence
and control by popularly elected governors and legislators. 155
Finally, a return to the non-delegation doctrine in the sphere of
the Parker doctrine would run counter to the very reasons of practical-
ity that led to its demise in the first place. As others have recog-
nized,156 it simply is impractical to require that all state policy deci-
sions to displace the federal p•o-competition norms be made by the
state legislature, unless nothing more than a general legislative deck-
AND THE NEW FEDERALISM: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 386, 395-97 (Marilyn Glitch ed.,
1986) [hereinafter Gormley, Policy Dilemmas1 (noting that stale social regulatory agencies
regulate so many industries that they are not easily dominated by oite and that it is easy to
exaggerate the impact of regulated industries on economic regulatory agencies).
152 See & Gellhorn, supra note 150, at 1412 (noting that a vital aspect of agency
rulemaking is the opportunity for participation of all interested parties through notice and
comment procedures); Gormley, Policy Dilemmas, supra note 151, at 398 (noting that citizen
groups are become increasingly active in stale administrative processes and the advent of
public advocacy offices); William T Gormleydr., Statewide Remedies for Public Undernpresenta-
lion in Regulatory Proceedings, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS, AND THE PEOPLE: SE-
LECTED READINGS FOR MANAGERS, EMPLOYEES, AND CITIZENS 399, 400-01 (Dean L Yar-
wood ed., 1987) [hereinafter Gormley, Statervidel (tracing the increase ill direct and
indirect public participation in state administrative proceedings).
153 See, e.g., Harold U. Bra'', Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 '1i 	 L.
REV. 1337, 1344-45 (1990) [hereinafter Bruff, Texas Constitution] (pointing out that state
agencies are subject to procedural safeguards and judicial review, as well as to legislative
and executive oversight and control through the lawmaking, appointments, and appro-
priations processes); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 150, at 1377-78, 1493 (1977); Gormley,
Policy Dilemmas, supra note 151, at 389-90; Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of
Agency Ruleinalting: An Essay on Management, Games and Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185, 251 (Spring 1994).
154 See, e.g., Gormley, Policy Dilemmas, supra note 151, at 392 (noting that eleven stales'
public utilities commissions are popularly elected).
155 See AISNEY & LAUTEL supra note 150, at 82 (noting that slate agencies report the
influence of the legislature and the governor to be much higher than that of interest
groups); CARY, supra note 150, at 59 (concluding that federal agencies are responsible to
Congress, particularly its committees, through budget review and oversight hearings);
Bruff, Texas Constitution, supra note 153, at 1349-95 (199(1); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note
150, at 1420 (noting congressional control of federal agencies through the oversight and
appropriations processes); Mashaw, supra note 153, at 185, 187, 200, 242, 248.
156 See Briar, Tiwas Constitution, supra note 153, at 1395 ("To insist that only the legisla-
litre make law, only the executive implement statutes, and only the courts adjudicate con-
troversies would destroy modern government."); Elhauge, supra note 8. at 691-92.
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ration of intent to allow the agency to adopt whatever anticompetition
policies that it wants will suffice. If this is indeed the case, the pur-
ported "clear legislative. statement" requirement would serve no pur-
pose at all. Page responds to this criticism by arguing that his attempt
to limit Parker-immune policies to those articulated by the state legisla-
ture is not a return to the anti-delegation past because it requires a
legislative "second look" only in cases where the agency's actions have
anticompetitive effects, leaving the legislature's delegation of policy-
making authority to the agency otherwise unimpaired.I 57 This, how-
ever, overlooks the immense potential for anticompetitive effects that
is inherent in the powers of both economic and other regulatory
agencies. The position that only policymaking authority that has no
potential anticompetitive impact may be delegated to state agencies
would represent an enormous and unwarranted interference with the
processes of state government.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
FOR STATE AGENCY ACTION
A. Clear Articulation
I. The Ambiguous Treatment of State Agency Policymaking
The Supreme Court never has decided whether the same clear
articulation requirement applicable to municipalities and private ac-
tors should be applied to anticompetitive regulations and programs
adopted by agencies of statewide jurisdiction. Its opinions look both
ways. In Packer itself, the Court rested its decision on the conclusion
that nothing in the language or history of the Sherman Act suggested
that Congress intended to "restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature," suggesting that only legislative
action could establish state policy for purposes of the Parker cioc-
trine.B8 •
This inference was reinforced in subsequent immunity cases deal-
ing with the actions of state agencies. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bat;
the Court rejected a claim of Parker immunity for a minimum fee
schedule for title examination services published by a county bar as-
sociation and enforced by the Virginia State Bar. 159 The state bar was
157 See Page, Interest Groups, supra tune 8, at 628-29.
1511 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,350-51 (1943).
157
 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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an "administrative agency" of the state for the purpose of investigating
and reporting violations of rules and regulations adopted by the state
supreme court. 160 The state legislature had authorized the Virginia
Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law. 161 The court had
adopted ethical codes which explicitly directed lawyers not to be con-
trolled by fee schedules. 162 In rejecting the claim of immunity, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the inquiry was whether the
activity in question was "required by the State acting as sovereign." 163
In Goldfarb, the Virginia Supreme Court had not required price fixing
and "the fact that the state bar is a state agency for some limited pur-
poses does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anti-
competitive practices for the benefit of its members. "164 The state bar,
by enforcing the minimum fee schedules of the county bar associa-
tion, had "voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticom-
petitive activity , . . . "IP
The Court's opinion could be read to imply that the state bar,
although a state agency for some purposes, could not adopt an anti-
competitive policy for the state that would be entitled to hither im-
munity. Fairly read, however., Goldfarb does not support the conclusion
that state agencies never may articulate Parker-immune anticompeti-
tive policies for the state. Goldfarb came before the Court's modern
rearticulation of the Pant doctrine and turned fundamentally on the
conclusion that the state had not compelled lawyers to adopt binding
fee schedules. 166 Moreover, the fee schedules enforced by the state bar
in Goldfarb had been adopted by local bar associations, with the state
bar simply playing an enforcement role. 167 There was no indication
that the state bar had focused on the specifics of the fees at issue or
determined that they should be adopted as a matter of state policy. Of
equal importance, nothing in Goldfarb suggested that the state bar had
authority under state law to promulgate binding fee schedules for at-
torneys. To the contrary, ultimate authority for regulation of the bar
was vested in the Virginia Supreme Court, whose guidelines directed
lawyers not to be controlled by binding fee schedules. 168 Goldfarb does
160 Id. at 776 n.2.
161 Id. at 789.
162 Id.
163 Id, at 790.
164 421 U.S. at 791.
405 Id. at 792.
166 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
167 421 U.S. at 791 11.21.
166 Id. at 785-90.
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not support the conclusion that a state agency, acting within the scope
of its delegated policymaking authority tinder state law, never may
adopt Parker-immune policy for the state.
The Supreme Court's next occasion to address the scope of
Parker immunity in the context of state agency action came in Cantor u
Detroit Edison Co. 169 The issue in Cantor was whether antitrust immunity
should be accorded to a provision of Detroit Edison's tariff providing
that light bulbs would be provided to customers of Edison's electric
service at no additional charge. The Court acknowledged that "re-
spondent's rates, including the omission of any separate charge for
bulbs, have been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commis-
sion, and may not be changed without the Commission's approval."'"
Nevertheless, it denied immunity to Edison.'" The Supreme Court
reasoned that even though Edison's adherence to the light bulb pro-
gram was compelled by state law, ,"there can be no doubt that the op-
tion to have, or not to have such a program is primarily respondent's,
not the Commission's. Indeed, respondent initiated the program
years before the regulatory agency was even created." 172
This language is subject to substantial criticism. It implies that the
existence of state action immunity for conduct explicitly compelled by
a state agency turns on whether the state or a benefited private party
is later determined "really" to have been responsible to the policy at
issue.'" That inquiry not only would be wholly intractable in the or-
'° 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
170 Id. at 582.
171 The Court's plurality opinion focused on the fact that the defendant was a private
entity, rather than a public official. See id. at 591. Although the Court since has repudiated
this distinction, and it is now clear that. the question of immunity turns on the nature of
the conduct at issue rather than the identity of the defendant, Cantor has been interpreted
by some as suggesting that only the state legislature could have adopted a Parker-immune
anticompetitive policy. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 58-59 (1985); Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1118; Page, Interest Croups, supra
note 8, at 621-22.
172 See Cantor; 428 U.S. at 591.
173 As the Court stated:
In each of these cases the initiation and enforcement of the program under
attack involved a mixture,of private and public decision making. In each case,
notwithstanding the state participation in the decision, the private party exer-
cised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court. to conclude that he
should be held responsible for the consequences of his decision.... There is
nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's participation in the decision
is sufficiently significant to require that its conduct implementing the deci-
sion, like comparable conduct by unregulated businesses, conform to appli-
cable federal law. Accordingly, even though there may be cases in which the
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Binary case but is, in terms of the theoretical foundations for state
action immunity, essentially meaningless. Implied antitrust immunity
has been accorded to the actions of state because they are authorita-
tive expressions of the state's sovereign policy. Those expressions of
state policy do not become less entitled to respect merely because
they were adopted at the instance of benefited private actors. The en-
tire line of cases according Noerr-Pennington immunity for private peti-
tioning activities seeking to induce governmental action rests on the
foundation that the ability of private actors to petition the govern-
ment for the adoption of public policies having private benefits is es-
sential to the proper functioning of our democratic process. 174
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 175 the Supreme
Court rejected any exception to either Parker or Noerr immunity based
on allegations that governmental actors had conspired with private
parties to adopt the anticompetitive regulations at issue. The Court
recognized that Parker and Noerr "generally present two faces of the
same coin." With specific reference to Parker immunity, the Court
rejected the contention that governmental regulatory action "may be
deemed private—and therefore subject to antitrust liability----when it
is taken pursuant to a conspiracy with private parties."'" This conclu-
sion followed from the "impracticability of such a principle .... Since
it is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often agree to
do what one or another group of private citizens urges upon them,
such an exception would virtually swallow up the Parker rule."
These passages in Omni might be read to have overruled Cantor
insofar as it relied on the alleged "dominant" role of Edison in the
Commission's approval of its light bulb policy. This, however, would
misread both Omni and Canton The essential predicate of the Su-
preme Court's rejection of state action immunity for the state-
approved light bulb tariff in Cantor was not that private actors had
proposed the particular tariff that the Commission adopted. Rather, it
was that, under the circumstances of that case, the Commission's ap-
State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would he unfair to
hold a private party responsible for his conduct in implementing it, this rec-
ord discloses no such mifairness.
Id. at 593-95.
174 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136-38 (1961).
175 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
17° Id. at 383.
177 Id. at 375.
178 Id.
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proval of the challenged provision of Edison's tariff did not represent
the implementation of any authoritatively adopted and generally ap-
plicable state policy at all. 179 Not only had the Michigan Public Utili-
ties Commission failed to adopt any generally applicable state policy
regarding the provision of light bulbs, but the tariff provision in ques-
tion was contrary to the tariffs of other utilities that the Commission
had approved."° The case thus fell well within Parker's admonition
that a state may not immunize private anticompetitive conduct by
generally authorizing it in advance or ratifying it after it has occurred.
Just as it is mistaken to view Cantor as grounding antitrust immu-
nity on an attempt to "deconstruct" the governmental process to as-
certain whether public or private actors "really" are responsible for
the governmental action at issue, so it would be mistaken to read that
decision as holding that state agencies never . may promulgate an
authoritative and generally applicable state policy that will be antitrust
immune. Page has made that suggestion, reading cantor as a holding
that, to effectuate the • Madisonian model of representative govern-
ment "only a state's legislature or rulings of its highest court [are]
authoritative sources of state regulatory policy. "81 In his view, Cantor
"makes the regulatory statute, and not the regulatory agency, the con-
trolling source of state policy."82 In a later article, Page reiterated his
view of Cantor as establishing that policies originating in "subordinate"
bodies such as regulatory agencies are never entitled to Parker Maim-
nity. 183
 He argues that this conclusion ensures that "state regulatory
policies in conflict with antitrust will be made in-representative bodies
170 As the Supreme Court explained at the very outset of its opinion:
The distribution of electric light bulbs in Michigan is unregulated.
[1sljeither the Michigan Legislature, nor the Commission, has ever made any
specific investigation of the desirability of a lamp-exchange program or of' its
possible effect on competition in the light bulb market. Other utilities regu-
lated by the Michigan Public Service Commission do not follow the practice
of providing bulbs to their customers at no additional charge. The Commis-
sion's approval of respondent's decision to maintain such a program does
not, therefore, implement any statewide policy relating to light bulbs. We in-
fer that the State's policy is neutral on the question whether a utility should,
or should not, have such a program.
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85 (emphasis added).
Is° See id.
181
 See Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1115.
182 frt. at 1118.
113 Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 621.
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alter a full Madisonian reconciliation of conflicting interests, rather
than in administrative bureaucracies."184
The assumption that the Supreme Court has dictated a particular
view of the dictates of "representative Madisonian democracy" to the
states in fashioning the scope of state action antitrust immunity is un-
justified. 185 To say, as the Court did in Cantor, that private action is not
entitled to Parker immunity where the concerned agency never has
adopted a policy of statewide authoritativeness and applicability en-
dorsing the conduct in question hardly implies that no immunity
should obtain where the agency has done just that. Indeed, far from
focusing on the absence of any legislative policy in favor of the light
bulb program in Canton the Court noted that its denial of Parker im-
munity in that case was based on the fact that "neither the Michigan
Legislature, nor the Commission, has ever made any specific investiga-
tion of the desirability of a lamp-exchange program or of its possible
effects on competition in the light-bulb market." 186 The fact that the
Commission had not adopted a policy entitled to immunity hardly
implies that it could not have done so. 187
The Court's next Parker decision involving the activities of state
agencies was Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 188 Bates held that the action of
the Arizona Supreme Court in suspending two attorneys for violating
a rule prohibiting lawyer advertising was protected by Parker. 189 Al-
though the suspension had beethimposed on recommendation of the
state bar, "the appellee acts as the agent of the [Arizona Supreme
Court] under its continuous supervision." 19° The alleged restraint was
the result of the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court,
which was the "ultimate body wielding the State's power over the
practice of law." 191' Cantor's light bulb program was distinguishable be-
cause it was "instigated by the utility with only the acquiescence of the
state regulatory commisSion." 92 Here, the disciplinary rules "reflect a
clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional be-
havior. Moreover, as the instant case shows, the rules are subject to
184 Id. at 621.
188 See supra notes 123-145 and accompanying text.
186 Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added).	 •
187 As discussed below, the Court's subsequent decision in Southern Motor Ca•riers
United States looks just the other way. See 471 U.S. at 48.
188 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
189 See id.
ig° See id. at 361.
191 Id, at 360.
194 Id. at 362.
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pointed re-examination by the policymaker the Arizona Supreme
Court in enforcement proceedings." 193
Similarly, in Hoover v. Ronwin, the Court held that the conduct of
the Arizona Supreme Court in rejecting, on recommendation of a
committee of the state bar, the plaintiff's application for admission to
the bar was ipso facto . immune from the antitrust laws without further
inquiry. 194
 The Court explained that "when a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State and ipso facto are
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." 95
 The Court con-
cluded that a state supreme court, acting in its legislative capacity,
"occupies the same position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a
decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judi-
cially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action"196 without
inquiry into the clear articulation and active supervision restrictions
placed on private actors and political subdivisions of the state. Al-
though the action had been brought against the members of the state
bar committee, the action in question was not that of the committee,
but that of the Arizona Supreme Court. 197 The members of the com-
mittee were state officers. However, they did not act independently,
but merely made recommendations to the state supreme court, which
made the final decision to grant or deny admission to the bar.'" By
contrast:
[I]f the replacing of entirely free competition with some
form of regulation or restraint was not authorized or ap-
proved by the State then the rationale of Pariter is inapposite.
As a result, in cases involving the anticompetitive conduct of
a nonsovereign state representative the Court has required a
showing that the conduct is pursuant to a "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy" [to ensure that the
anticompetitive conduct of the state's representative was
contemplated by the state].I"
These decisions are susceptible to the interpretation that agen-
cies exercising statewide jurisdiction are subject to the same clear ar-
193 Bales, 433 U.S. at 362.
194
 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
' 95 Id. al 567-68.
196 Id. at 568.
197 Id. at. 570-72.
1 " Id.
199 Hoover; 466 U.S. at 568-69 (emphasis added).
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ticulation and active supervision requirements as municipalities and
private actors, but they hardly compel that conclusion. In holding in
Bates and Hoover that actions by a state supreme court were antitrust
immune, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that the actions of
a state agency empowered by state law to articulate policy for the state
as a whole could, under some circumstances, be accorded Parker im-
munity.
The ambiguities of the Supreme Court's opinions on this impor-
tant issue again surfaced in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.
United States."° In that case, the Court held that the Parker doctrine
barred a suit against private carriers challenging collective ratemaking
that was authorized but not compelled by state law."' Because the
conduct at issue was that of private parties, the Court applied the two-
pronged Midcal test—clear articulation and active supervision. 202
Statutes in three of the four states at issue expressly authorized collec-
tive ratemaking." In holding that the clear articulation requirement
was satisfied in these states, the Court noted that although the public
service commissions in those states 'permitted collective ratemaking,
those state agencies "acting alone" could not immunize anticompeti-
tive conduct. 204 Relying on Goldfarb, the Court stated that "Parker im-
munity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken
pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of the State itself such as a policy ap-
proved by a state legislature . . . or a State Supreme Court."205
However, the statutes of Mississippi, the fourth state at issue, sim-
ply provided that the public service commission was to establish just
and reasonable rates." The details of regulation were left to the
agency. 207 In according antitrust immunity to collective rate making
authorized by the state commission, the Supreme Court emphasized
that if more detail had been required in the commission's authorizing
legislation, states would find it difficult to implement their policies
through regulatory agencies." This more realistic view of the limited
290 471 U.S. at 48.
201 See id.
202 Id. at 58-50.
203 Id. at 62.
204 Id. at 62-63.
208
 So u thern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 63-64.
2°7 Id.
208 The Southern Motor Carriers Court staled: "Agencies are created because they are
able to deal with problems unforeseeable to, or outside the competence of the legislature.
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capacity of state legislatures and the important role played by state
agencies in the formulation and articulation of state policy under-
scores the significant encroachment on state policy that would attend
a rigid limitation of Parker immunity only to anticompetitive policies
formulated by the ultimate legislative authority of the state.
2. The Emerging Trend of Lower Court Decisions Upholding the
Power of State Administrative Agencies to Articulate ParkeF
Immune Policy for the State
Although many lower federal courts have assumed without analy-
sis that the same clear articulation requirement applicable to the ac-
tions of private actors and municipalities also applies to state agencies
exercising statewide jurisdiction, 209
 a number of important decisions
have rejected that view.210
 Instead, they have endorsed the application
of Parker immunity to anticompetitive state policies adopted by state
agencies within the scope of the powers delegated to them by state
law.
For example, Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transporta-
tion involved a claim that the Hawaii Department of Transportation
("DOT") had violated the antitrust laws by rejecting plaintiff's bid for
an airport concession lease. 2 " The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that "we see no reason why a state executive branch,
when operating within its constitutional and statutory authority,
should be deemed any less sovereign than a state legislature, or less
entitled to deference under principles of federalism."212 Subsequently, •
in Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., the same
court applied Deak-Perrem to hold that the Hawaii DOT's award of an
exclusive franchise for taxi service to pick up passengers at the Hawaii
International Airport was antitrust immune. 213 Under Deak-Perrem, the
actions of the DOT were immune so long as it was acting within its
constitutional and statutory authority. 214
 Hawaii statutes broadly
authorized DOT to enter contracts for the supply of goods and serv-
ices to the airport. That was sufficient to confer Parker immunity with-
Requiring express authorization for every action that an agency might find necessary to
effectuate state policy would diminish, if not destroy, its usefulness." Id. at 64.
209 See supra note 27.
210 See infra notes 211-233 and accompanying text.
211 745 E2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984).
212 Id. at 1283.
2" 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987).
214 Id. at 875-76.
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out more.215 The clear articulation and active supervision require-
ments constraining municipal and private action were simply inappli-
cable. The court drew support for its conclusion from Hoover and
Bates, which required no evidence of "legislative contemplation" in
holding that state supreme courts were immune for their actions in
adopting•and enforcing disciplinary rules to govern the state ban 216
In California CNG, Inc. v. Southern California Gas Co., the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a California statute authoriz-
ing the California Public Utilities Commission (the "CPUC") to per-
mit utilities to construct and maintain natural gas refueling stations
for motor vehicles at ratepayer expense. 217 The statute also provided
that the commission should ensure that public utilities should not
compete unfairly with private non-utility enterprises. 218 The plaintiff
complained that Southern California Gas had unfairly competed with
it by providing refueling stations to fleet operators for free. 219 The
court concluded that "the legislature's clearly articulated policy is to
have the CPUC balance the need for utility participation in the devel-
opment of the NGV-infrastructure market and the need for that mar-
ket to develop into a competitive one." 22° The court looked to the
CPUC's position to determine "whether SoCalGas's conduct is part of
a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy: '1 221
The court held that the defendant's conduct was undertaken pursu-
ant to a clearly articulated state policy for an initial period, during
which the CPUC expressly had authorized ratepayer subsidization, but
was not immune during subsequent periods in which the CPUC first
generally had prohibited unfair competition with nott-utility enter-
prises, and then specifically had prohibited ratepayer subsidization. 222
Similarly, in Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envi-
ronmental Systems, Inc., the Court. of Appeals for the Second Circuit
suggested that state agencies may in some circumstances articulate
Parker-immune anti-competition policy for the state as a whole. 223 In
that case, the Connecticut Resources Recovery Agency had entered a
settlement agreement under which it and a private waste-to-energy
215 Id.
2/6 Id.
217 96 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 l 5 Sre CAL. Pun. U.ri L. Cone § 745.5(e) (West 2000).
2 ' 9 California CNG, 96 F.3d at 1195.
no Id .
221 M.
222 Id. at 1197-1200.
223 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
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facility agreed that each would turn away waste contractually commit-
ted to the other. 224
 Waste haulers who had engaged in "cross hauling"
of contractually committed waste to take advantage of More favorable
spot rates brought an antitrust action challenging the agreement. 225
The Court of Appeals, although ultimately concluding that the
agreement was protected by the clearly articulated policy of the state
legislature,226
 strongly suggested that the CRRA itself should be
treated as an authorized state policymaker for Parker immunity pur-
poses.227 The court concluded that "the degree of control exercised by
the State is a critical factor in determining whether the conduct of a
state agency is that of 'the state itself' for the purposes of the Parker
doctrine. "228
 The CRRA was "not simply a statewide agency making
policy on its own" but was a "creature of the General Assembly" and
was subject to supervision by the state's Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection. 229
Although Automated Salvage was on firm ground in recognizing
that state agencies acting within the sphere of their statutory authority
may, in some circumstances, establish Parker-immune state policy free •
from the constraints of the clear articulation requirement, its focus on
the "control" of the CRRA by another state agency was misplaced. Far
from cutting against a claim of immunity, the relative independence
of a state agency from detailed or routine supervision by other execu-
tive branch agencies or the legislature simply underscores the author-
ity of the agency to establish Parker-immune anticompetitive policy for
the state as a whole—subject always to the possibility of political check
by the Governor, the state legislature, or, ultimately, the electorate.
Most recently, in Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn
Screening Program, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit strongly
endorsed the view that the authoritative policy declarations of state
224 See id. at 68-70.
225 See id.
'226
 Id. at 72.
227
 The court stated that "there are compelling reasons for concluding that CRRA
should be treated as the State itself rather than as a municipality .... CRRA was created to
implement a uniform statewide waste disposal policy .... CRRA is not only a statewide
entity that 'undertakes slate functions,' it is 'politically accountable to the State, and by
extension to the electorate.'" Id: at 70-71. The court noted that CRRA's board included
the Commissioners of Transportation and Economic Development, the Secretary of the
Office of Policy and Management, four gubernatorial appointees, and six legislative ap-
pointees. The chairman served at the pleasure of the Governor and any member of the
board could be removed by the Governor for neglect or misconduct. See id.
225 Automated Salvage, 155 F.lid at 70.
229 Id. at 71:
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agencies are ipso facto antitrust immune. 2" The action involved a deci-
sion by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health to enter an
exclusive arrangement for the medical screening of newborn children
with the University of Massachusetts medical schoo1. 231 A competitor
challenged the arrangement, arguing that Parker was inapposite be-
cause no clear legislative authorization for the exclusive arrangement
existed. 232 Noting that the Supreme Court had reserved decision as to
whether state-level executive branch departments or agencies are en-
titled to Parker immunity as broad as that accorded to state legislatures
and supreme courts, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
cluded that they were."'
Decisions such as Deak-Perr►a, Charley's Radio Dispatch, and Neo Gen
Screening rest on the view that, so long as state administrative agencies
act within the sphere of their delegated state law authority in develop-
ing anticompetitive regulatory policies for the state as a whole, actions
taken pursuant to those policies should be antitrust immune. 234 This
position is preferable to the suggestion that only state legislatures are
capable of articulating policy entitled to Parker immunity—a conclu-
sion that reflects a wholly unrealistic view of the limited capabilities of
state legislatures and is inconsistent with the underlying reasons for
the creation of administrative agencies, i.e., to formulate and adminis-
ter state policy in areas requiring sustained attention and technical
expertise.235
23°187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999).
251 Id
, at 27.
232 Id. at 28.
233 The court staled:
Broadly speaking, the Parker doctrine represents a judgment by the Supreme
Court that, in regulating anticompetitive business conduct, Congress was not
seeking to regulate the slates themselves; and "the states" include their execu-
tive branches quite as much as their legislatures and their courts. The mu-
nicipalities have been given less protection under Parker on the stated ground
that technically speaking, they are not the state"....
Id. at 29.
234 See infra notes 221-241 and accompanying text.
233 Compare Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, with Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65, and
Elhauge, supra note 8, at 692, and Wiley, supra note 8, at 731-32. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Che111071 U.S.A. Inc. to Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1989):
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference:
the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconcil-
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Of equal importance, application of the federal antitrust laws to
circumscribe the ability of the states to develop anticompetitive state
policy through the administrative process would be starkly inconsis-
tent with the federalism basis of Parker itself. Pather contains no hint
that the Court intended to prescribe the forms of state government,
or to pick and choose among anticompetitive policies validly adopted
for the state as a whole by an authorized representative of state gov-
ernment. Southern Motor Carriers implicitly adopts the view that anti-
competitive polices adopted by state agencies for the state as a whole
within the sphere of their state law authority are entitled to Parker
immunity.236
 Similarly, the Supreme Court's decisions in Hoover and
Bates—recognizing the power of state supreme courts to adopt Parker-
immune policies with respect to the governance of the state bar—are
inconsistent with any attempt to confine Parker solely to policies
clearly articulated by the state legislature itself. 237 The conclusion that
state agencies acting within the scope of their state law policy making
authority may articulate Parker-immune anticompetitive policy for the
states does not imply that they may repeal the antitrust laws free of
any meaningful constraint. Like state legislatures, state agencies
should be subject to the norms of prospectivity, general applicability,
and specificity in their articulation of antitrust immune state policy. 238
Ironically, despite the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's current
"foreseeability" test for ,determining whether the activities of local
governmental units and private parties have been undertaken pursu-
ant to a clearly articulated state policy, 239 that test may be very much
on point in determining whether a state administrative agency or the
head of an executive department has acted within the scope of its
delegated authority in articulating an anticompetitive policy for the
state. That is because the scope of an agency's policymaking authority
ing conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests,
but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases ....
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such 13°114 choices—resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light
of everyday realities.
Chewun, 467 U.S. at 806-67(citations omitted).
236 See supra notes 200-208 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 188-199 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 56-121 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 89-90,111-113 . and accompanying text.
September 20001
	
Slate Agencies and Antitrust Ittununity 	 1105
as a matter of state law frequently may turn on whether its action was
a "reasonable" interpretation . of its enabling statute. 24° Whether it was
reasonable in turn presents essentially the same question as the Su-
preme Court's requirement in HaIlie 241 that municipal action be
"foreseeable" in the sense that it "logically would result" front the
powers granted if it is to be antitrust immune. 242 Page reinforces this
view by arguing that although only the legislature may "clearly articu-
late" Parker immune policy for the state, it may satisfy this obligation
with only the most general expression of an intention to displace
competition with regulation in a particular market secto•. 243 Thus, in
his view the Southern Motor Carriers result was correct—even for Missis-
sippi, in which there had been no legislative approval of collective ra-
temaking—because, as the Supreme Court recognized, the state legis-
lature generally had authorized the agency to implement an
"inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process." 244
In practical reality, this expansive view refutes the premise that
only a state legislature may articulate Parker immune policy for the
state. The Supreme Court consistently has adhered to the view that a
state may not immunize private anticompetitive conduct, such as that
at issue in Southern Motor Carriers, by a general advance authorization
without any specification of the particular type of anticompetitive
conduct that it intends to permit. 245 Where nothing more than a gen-
eral authorization to regulate a particular industry in an anticompeti-
tive manner constrains a state agency, the agency is left to its own de-
vices in determining what the state's competition policy is. As Judge
Posner has pointed out, competition may co-exist with regulation in a
variety of settings, and a general authorization to regulate a market
240 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that an agency's construa;tion of its statu-
tory authorization will be upheld if it is reasonable). For state decisions following Chevron,
see generally Ahern a. Thomas, 733 A.2d 756 (Conn. 1999); Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Se•vs., 731 A.2d 845, 848 (1).C. 1999); Granite
City Die of Nat'l Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 733 (III. 1993); Dept.
of Tramp. t. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Md. 1987); State ex rel. Comm of Ins. v. North
Carolina Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 562 (NC. 1980); Appalachian Pour?• Co. v. State Tax
Dept., 466 S.E.2d 424, 441 (W. Va. 1995); Alexander v. Anderson, 973 P.2d 884, 889 (N.M. Ci.
App. 1999).
241 Town of I iallie v, City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
242 Id. at 43.
243 Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 643(11 it is apparent to all participants in the
legislative process that the legislation displaces competition in the market affected, then
the political process has worked and exemption should follow.").
244 Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
245
 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
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sector provides little guidance on the extent to which competition
should be displaced.246
 By the same token, . a general legislative
authorization to displace competition with respect to a particular in-
dustry or activity does nothing to determine the extent to which com-
petition should be displaced. Where that decision is left to the un-
guided discretion of a state agency, it is illusory to view the state
legislature as the "politically accountable" source of a state policy that
in fact has been adopted by the agency itself.
3. The Weight to Be Accorded to State Agency Rules and
Interpretations in Determining State Policy
The previous discussion also sheds light on the recurring ques-
don of the weight that state agency rules, regulations, and interpreta-
tions should receive in determining what the state's clearly articulated
competitive policy is. If one were to proceed on the erroneous view
that state policy may be accorded antitrust immunity only if it has
been clearly articulated by the legislature itself, it would follow that
state agency rules and regulations implementing broad declarations
of state policy or interpreting ambiguous state statutes would be enti-
tled to no special deference or weight in resolving the immunity ques-
tion. However, most lower courts have accorded considerable defer-
ence to state agency declarations of state policy under broad or
ambiguous statutory mandates in determining what state competition
policy is. 247 For the reasons previously discussed, failure to accord
weight to the rules and regulations of state agencies in assessing
whether the state clearly has articulated a state policy to displace
246 Specifically, Judge Posner stated:
[01ften it is difficult to determine whether the state has a regulatory program
designed to supplant the operation of the free market. It may have a regula-
tory program but one that can coexist happily with the full enforcement of
federal antitrust principles because the program does not require the sup-
planting of competition ....
Hardy v. City Optical Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 768 (7111 Cir. 1994).
242 See, e.g., Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111  F.3d 1427 (9th
Cir. 1997); California CNC, 96 F.3d at 1196-97; Yeager's Fuel, 22 F.3d at 1268-69 (district
court properly gave weight to report of Bureau of Conservation, Economic and Energy
Planning of state Public Utilities Commission in determining what state energy conserva-
tion policy was); Nugget Hydroelectric v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429 (9th Cir.
1992); Metro Mobil CTS, Inc. v. New Vector Communications, Inc., 661 F. Stipp. 1504,
1512 (I). Ariz. 1987), affil on other grounds, 892 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1989); Health Care Equali-
zation Comm. of Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y. v. Iowa Med. Soc'y., 501 F. Stipp. 970, 991 (S.D.
Iowa 1980), affil, 851 E2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
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competition with regulation could be justified only if the court con-
cludes that the legislature has delegated no authority in the agency to
determine either the general policy of the state with respect to the
matter in question or the details of the policy's application in particu-
lar cases. Where such authority has validly been delegated to the
agency as a matter of state law, however, the agency's determinations
should not simply be entitled to weight. but should be viewed as con-
clusive expressions of state policy, provided that the agency has acted
within the scope of its delegated authority under state law. 248 As dis-
cussed below, this does not mean that the agency will be able retroac-
tively to immunize private anticompetitive conduct after it has already
occurred. Nor does it mean that the agency may accord immunity by
contravening express limitations on its authority or express declara-
tions of legislative policy.
4. The Consistency of Agency Policymaking with the Origins of the
Clear Articulation Requirement
Those who seek to ground the Parker doctrine in the direct re-
sponsiveness of the state policymaker to the electorate have attempted
to find support for their position in the clear articulation require-
ment.249 This view is difficult to reconcile with the extremely lenient
interpretation of the clear articulation requirement advocated by its
proponents. Thus, Page suggests that it is sufficient to ensure the di-
rect political responsiveness he advocates that the state legislature
generally declare that it "intends to displace competition with gov-
ernmental regulation in a particular market" and that "if it is appar-
ent to all participants in the legislative process that the legislation dis-
places competition in the market affected, then the political process
248 In Chevron, the Supreme Comm held with respect to the analogous question in the
context of federal administmtive agencies that where Congress has not spoken directly to
an issue, "the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute ....
Rather, ... the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843 (citations omitted). Furthermore, "[ill
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843-44 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
249 page,
 Interest Groups, supra note 8, at (119 (arguing that the clear articulation re-
quirement "reinforces representative political processes"); see also Inman & Ruhinfeld,
supra note 8, 1250, 1260-62 (arguing that the clear articulation requirement was devel-
oped to "maximize citizen participation").
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has worked and exemption should follow."250 Although this broad
view of the clear articulation is compelled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Southern MOtor Carriers, it is at odds with Parker's clear hold-
ing that simple state authorization of anticompetitive conduct—or
ratification of that conduct after it has occurred—is insufficient to
confer antitrust immunity. 251
 If the legislature cannot immunize pri-
vate anticompetitive conduct simply by authorizing it in general
terms, there is, under the view that only the actions of the state legis-
lature "count" for Parker immunity purposes, no more warrant for the
view that the legislature can confer immunity by generally authorizing
a state agency to approve anticompetitive private arrangements in ad-
vance.
The idea that a general legislative authorization of "anticompeti-
tive activity" in a particular market is sufficient to satisfy the clear ar-
ticulation requirement also is inconsistent with Page's central idea
that only legislative determinations of state anticompetition policy
matter because only the legislature can ensure the democratic recon-
ciliation of competing interests and the direct political accountability
On which the legitimacy of that reconciliation depends. If nothing is
decided by the legislature other than the fact that a subordinate entity
of state government may, in its discretion, approve unspecified anti-
competitive conduct, no competing interests will have been resolved
by the legislature, and the voters. will have no basis—other than a
sweeping determination that regulation is utterly unjustified in the
market in question—for calling those legislators to account. Indeed,
as Page elsewhere acknowledges, the very reason for broad legislative
delegations of authority to state agencies may be to avoid the visibility
and direct political accountability that a more detailed specification of
anticompetition policy might entai1, 252
The origins and rationale of the clear articulation requirement
are to be found in a quite different direction than proponents of the
"Madisonian democracy" view of Parker immunity suggest. Rather than
being primarily focused on the direct responsiveness of the decision
maker to the electorate, the clear articulation requirement is directed
250 Page, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at (i43.
251
 Compare Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 48, with Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52.
252 See Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1111-12 ("Elected representatives, however, have
great incentives to defuse public controversies, which naturally arise under such a system,
and often do so by transferring responsibility for actual resolution of important policy
issues to administrative agencies under statutory commands to regulate 'in the public in-
terest.").
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primarily to the decision-maker itself. It is designed to ensure that
even an authorized state decision-maker does not repeal the funda-
mental national policy of the antitrust laws without clear recognition
of what is it doing and a deliberate decision to act in that way. As the
Supreme Court explained in Federal Trade Commission V. Ticor Title In-
surance Co., both the clear articulation and active supervision re-
quirements "are directed at ensuring that particular anticompetitive
mechanisms operate because of a deliberate and intended state pol-
icy. "255
The Court's focus in Ticor on the goal of the clear statement rule
—ensuring that state approval of conduct falling outside the prevail-
ing federal pro-competition norm is deliberately intended by the
authorized state policymaker—is consistent with a long line of Su-
preme Court decisions adopting a similar clear statement require-
ments for actions that threaten to upset the customary allocation of
powers between the federal and state governments. 254 As the Court
explained in United States v. Bass, in narrowly construing a federal
statute to avoid intruding on the criminal jurisdiction traditionally
reserved to the states, "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
will not be deemed to have .significantly changed the federal-state bal-
ance."255 "In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting
the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision." 256
In a series of subsequent decisions, the Court has applied the
same clear statement rule in cases involving claims that Congress had
abrogated, or that the states had waived, their Eleventh Amendment
20 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992). The Court staled:
States must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to under-
take. It is quite a different matter, however, for federal law to compel a result
that the States do nut intend bul fur which they arc held to account. Federal-
is ► serves to assign political accountability, not to obscure it. Neither federal-
ism nor political, responsibility is well served by a rule that essential national
policies are displaced by state regulations intended to achieve more limited
ends. For States which do choose to displace the free market with regulation,
our insistence on real compliance with both parts of the Midcal test will serve
to make clear that the State is responsible for the price ilxing it has sanc-
tioned and undertaken to control.
234 See infra n otes 268-272.
2" TiC0)• 504 U.S. al 349.
258 M.
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immunity from suit in federal court and in other contexts that impli-
cated "the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers." 257
In each instance, the Court's stated purpose was not to ensure visibil-
ity to the electorate or direct political responsiveness per se, but rather,
to ensure that the federal or state decision-maker had deliberately
confronted and resolved the fundamental alteration of the federal
state balance that its actions would entail. 258
As the Court explicitly recognized in Ticon this "sober reflection"
rationale for the clear statement rule in situations involving altera-
tions in the customary federal-state balance is very much on point in
the context of the judicially implied inverse preemption doctrine cre-
ated by Parker v. Brown. Just as the Court has required that Congress's
intent to preempt matters falling within the historic police powers of
the states be "clear and manifest,"259 so it is appropriate that a state's
intention to supersede the. otherwise exclusive federal statutory juris-
diction over antitrust matters be unmistakably expressed. A rule of
clear statement as a condition of Parker preemption in this otherwise
presumptively federal sphere also serves to reinforce the fundamental
premise of non-retroactivity by ensuring that decisions to displace the
federally mandated pro-competition norm be made by an authorized
state policymaker in advance rather than as the result of an ex post
facto judicial ratification of private anticompetitive initiative under an
ambiguous declaration of state policy.
This justification of the clear statement principle does not imply
that only a state legislature's declarations of state policy may support a
Parker immunity claim. To the extent that the clear statement rule is
intended to ensure that state policy contrary to the federal antitrust
norm is adopted only as a result of careful reflection and deliberate
intention, it fully serves that purpose whether the policymaker in
question is the state legislature or a state agency acting within the
2" See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ethic. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,55 (1996); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460 (1991); Deihnuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); Atascadero State
Ilosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1085).
258 See also Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103,
110 (1998) (holding Congress must make its intent to allow state taxation of Indian lands
"unmistakably clear"); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 325 (1997) (stating requirement for
clear statement to authorize retroactive application of legislation assures that Congress has
affirmatively considered the potential unfairness involved); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc„ 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (stating that federal preemption of areas traditionally sub-
ject to stale police powers will not be found unless that is the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress).
259 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
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scope of its state policymaking authority. To the extent that the clear
statement rule additionally serves the values of federalism by ensuring
that the source of responsibility for the anticompetitive policy at issue
is clear, that purpose is equally served no matter what authorized
policymaker clearly articulates the policy of the state. 26°
Of course, the clear statement rule does in some sense ensure.
that a state's decisions to depart from the federal pro-competition
norm are both visible and subject to ultimate political check. Nothing
in any of the Supreme Court's Parker decisions, however, supports the
conclusion that the possibility of an after the fact political check is
sufficient in itself to support a claim of antitrust immunitym or that
only the direct political accountability of the legislature to the elector-
ate may be taken into account. One of the most prominent grounds
for criticism of the Supreme Court's Parker doctrine has been the
claim that it unduly interferes with the states' ability to delegate poli-
cytnaking authority to municipalities and other local governmental
units. While I disagree with this criticism on the ground that the in-
terests of federalism justify a distinction between policies authorita-
tively adopted for the state as a whole and those variously and incon-
sistently adopted by local units of government, the impairment of the
values of federalism entailed by the Court's municipal action deci-
sions pales in.•comparison with the impairment that would arise from
an attempt to prescribe the instruments of statewide policymaking
authority that will be recognized under the Parker doctrine.
B. Active Supervision
State agencies occupy a dual role with respect to the articulation
and implementation of state policy. Unlike municipalities, they may,
within the scope of their delegated state law authority, adopt anti-
competitive regulatory policies for the state as a whole. Because those
actions by definition constitute state policy, they should be entitled to
antitrust immunity under the Parker doctrine without any further re-
quirement for clear articulation or active supervision by the state leg-
islature.
But state agencies do not always prescribe state policy. Some
agencies and officials may lack the power to make broad policy de-
260 CI Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (imposing a clear statement rule on the
highest court of the state to insulate its decisions from judicial review on the basis of an
adequate and independent state ground). ,
261 See supra notes 142-145.
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terminations as a matter of state law. Others may possess state-wide
policymaking authority with respect to certain matters but be con-
strained by specific limitations prescribed by the state legislature in
other respects. In such cases, implementations of state policy by the
agency should not be entitled to antitrust immunity unless they are
pursuant to an anticompetitive policy previously articulated by an
authorized state policymaker such as the state legislature.
For the same reason that municipalities are exempt from the ac-
tive supervision requirement, however, the Parker doctrine should in
such cases impose no requirement that the actions of state agencies in
approving particular transactions, tariffs, or activities be subject to the
active supervision of the state legislature. That is not simply because
such supervision Would be impracticable (which it would) or because
it would intrude unduly on the processes of state government. Nor is
it because state agencies are not likely to promote private interests or
be subject to capture by regulated parties. Rather, it is because as a
matter of state law the agency possesses authority to determine the
specifics of state policy by approving particular transactions of the
kind previously endorsed by the state legislature.
Although state agencies therefore should not be subjected to the
active supervision requirement either with respect to their own pre-
scriptions of state regulatory policy, or for their determinations that
particular transactions or activities accord with state policy elsewhere
prescribed, they play an important role in supervising the anticom-
petitive conduct of private parties undertaken pursuant to state regu-
latory programs. 262 For example, in Southern Motor Carriers, the Court
held without discussion, as the govermnent had conceded, that active
supervision of private conduct by state agencies fulfilled the require-
ments of the Parker doctrine. 263
Recognition of the multiple roles that state agencies play in the
articulation and supervision of state policy does little to explain the
underlying basis of the Supreme Court's two-pronged approach to the
state action immunity question in this context. The Supreme Court
262 See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949, 963 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating
that It would be extremely impractical to limit 'active state supervision' to the oversight by
[Me state legislature or Supreme Court]").
263 Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65; see also California CNG, 96 F.3d at 1193 (stat-
ing that agency supervision of utility's application to spend ratepayer hinds on competitive
activity satisfied active supervision requirement); Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power Light Co.,
64 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that Public Service Commission approval of territo-
rial allocation by utilities satisfied requirement).
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has determined that states may not immunize private anticompetitive
conduct merely by authorizing private parties to violate the antitrust
laws or by ratifying their conduct after it has occurred. 264
 Rather, the
state itself must first clearly articulate its intention to authorize the
type of anticompetitive conduct at. issue in advance, and second, "have
and exercise" the power to approve the details of the particular pri-
vate conduct undertaken pursuant to that policy before immunity will
obtain. 265
The Supreme Court has never explained just why this two-stage
process of review should be required as a condition for invoking
Parker immunity. In fact, the Court has stated that the two levels of
review both are aimed at achieving precisely the same goal—to assure
that private anticompetitive conduct in fact reflects state policy.266
This has led some commentators to suggest that the active supervision
requirement performs no separate role, and should be jettisoned as
an undue restriction on the ability of state governments to structure
their own operations. 267Moreover, if governmental approval of the
details of private anticompetitive arrangements is required, and if
such approval is required to operate only prospectively as the Su-
preme Court has assumed, 268 the Court has never explained why ac-
tive supervision of particular private arrangements after they have
been entered or proposed by regulated private parties should not,
standing alone, be sufficient to support a claim of Parker immunity,
even absent any antecedent clear articulation of anticompetitive pol-
icy by an authorized policymaker for the state.
The Court's two-stage analysis becomes more understandable,
however, when viewed with reference to the locus of state authority to
adopt anticompetitive policy for the state as a whole. Frequently the
locus of state law authority to establish a generally applicable, state-
wide policy favoring certain types of governmental or private anti-
competitive conduct will differ from. the locus of authority to approve
particular private or public anticompetitive arrangements as falling
within that policy. For example, only the state legislature may have the
21'4 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
2f.5
 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94,101 (1988) (citing Southern Motor Carrieis, 471 U.S. at
51).
206 See, e.g., Thor, 504 U.S. at 636 (slating that Mil-Ices two elements both are directed
to ensuring that anticompetitive conduct operates because of a deliberate state policy);
Town of Bathe, 471 U.S. at 46-47 (stating that the active supervision requirement serves the
"evidentiary function" of ensuring that private conduct is pursuant to state policy).
267 See, e.g., Joule, supra note 8, 248-49; Page, Antitrust, supra note 8, at 1125-29.
268 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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authority to adopt a state-wide policy allowing municipalities or other
local governmental units to enter exclusive contracts for the provision
of cable television or other services. For that reason, even if, as the
courts overwhelmingly have assumed, the active supervision require-
ment may be satisfied by approval of particular private arrangements
by municipalities without further involvement of the state legisla-
ture, 269
 dispensing with. the requirement for a clear articulation of
state policy by the state legislature in advance would omit the most
important component of Parker immunity doctrine—the requirement
that the anticompetitive policy at issue be adopted by a state policy-
maker authorized to establish regulatory policy for the state as a
whole. No amount of active supervision of the particulars of a private
anticompetitive arrangement by a municipality or other local gov-
ernmental body could satisfy this requirement because those institu-
tions of local government are not authorized to establish policy for
the state as a whole. By contrast, where an authorized state actor has
adopted an anticompetitive policy for the entire state, approval of the
details of private action taken pursuant to that policy is appropriately
vested in the state or local agency whose particular geographic or sub-
ject matter responsibilities include the activities in question. 279
In short, the Court's two-pronged approach to Parker immunity
stems from the frequent divergence, as a matter of state law, of the
authority and occasion to establish state-wide policy on the one hand
and to police the details of the implementation of state policy already
declared on the other. Where state agencies are themselves author-
ized to establish state-wide anticompetitive policy with respect to par-
ticular matters, however, that divergence does not exist. It follows that
. 21 two-stage process of approval should not be required, and that an
agency should be able to articulate Parker immune state policy in the
course of its prospective approval of particular private anticompetitive
tariffs or arrangements.
Of course, state agencies that are authorized to adopt anticom-
petitive state-wide regulatory policies may frequently do so through a
21ig See Tom Hudson & Assocs. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir.
1984); see also Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st
Cir. 1993). But see Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Cmty. Improvement Corp., 774 F.2d 162,
163 (6th Cir. 1985) (altering earlier order and instructing district court to determine on
remand whether the state—as opposed to the city—had - actively supervised a private de-
fendant's conduct pursuant to municipal regulation).
2" See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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process of general rulemaking. 271 In such cases, a second stage of fo-
cus and approval of particular private arrangements undertaken pur-
suant to that policy must be required. 272 In many instances, however,
the regulatory process proceeds initially by the proposal of a particu-
lar anticompetitive tariff for agency approval by a regulated private
entity. In such cases, the active supervision and approval of that tariff
by the agency should suffice to confer antitrust immunity for future
conduct pursuant to the tariff without any requirement that the
agency have clearly articulated anticompetitive state policy in a sepa-
rate previous rulemaking proceeding. In such cases, where the locus
of state-side policymaking and supervisory authority are the same, any
requirement for a two-stage process of approval is meaningless. 275
In Metro Mobil CTS, Inr,. v. New Vector Communications, Inc., the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona recognized this reality of the
regulatory process. 274 Metro Mobil involved an alleged price squeeze
between wholesale and retail cellular rates. 275 The Arizona Corpora-
tion Commission had considered the price squeeze allegations in the
course of approving the wholesale rates.276 The court upheld a claim
of Parker immunity, concluding that it was not necessary that Arizona
statutes specifically articulate a. policy in favor of price squeezes.
Rather, the agency could satisfy the clear articulation requirement in
the course of implementing its broad delegation of regulator) , author-
ity. 277 Moreover, the agency could meet the clear articulation re-
quirement by approving a specific tariff rather than by separate rule-
making.278 The court concluded that "the distinction between an
agency establishing an encompassing policy of price fixing, as in
Southern Motor Carriers, and an agency expressly determining that a
01 See, e.g., California CNG, 96 F.3d at 1199-1200 (finding clear articulation of state pol-
icy in general CPUC guidelines); Nugget Hydroelectric, 981 F.2d at 434-35 (same); see also
'FEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560,1567 (11th Cir. 1906);
Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co„ 22 F.3d 1260,1268 (3d Cir. 1994).
272 see
 Nugget Hydradectric, 981 E2d at 435.
275 California CNG, 96 17.3d at 1197-99,1202 (finding both clear articulation and active
supervision requirements satisfied by CPUC approval of specific ratepayer applications).
274 661 F. Stipp. at 1504.
2" Id. at 1510-11.
276 M. at 1511.
277 Id. at 1510.
278 Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1967) (holding that the NLRB may
announce new policies in adjudicatory proceedings); SEC v. Chettery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943) (same); see also 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RR:11Am) J. PIERCE, JR., ADNIINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (3d ed. 1994).
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specific tariff is just and reasonable ... is a distinction without sub-
stance for purposes of state action immunity analysis." 279
The merging of the clear articulation and active supervision re-
quirements for state action antitrust immunity in the context of the
activities of state regulatory agencies also was apparent in the Ninth
Circuit decision in Columbia Steel Casting Co. u Portland General Electric
Co.280
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim
that because state statutes authorized the public utility commission to
approve agreements between utilities allocating exclusive service terri-
tories, the state had satisfied the clear articulation requirement, and
the action of the utility commission in approving particular agree-
ments was relevant only to whether the state had "actively supervised"
their creation. 281
 The court rejected a claim of immunity based on a
1992 Commission order declaring that the Public Utility Commis-
sion's intent in issuing a 1972 order approving the exchange of facili-
ties between two utilities in specified areas had been to create exclu-
sive service territories. 282 The court reasoned that although a clear
statement of the Commission's intent in 1972 to create exclusive serv-
ice territories could have satisfied the clear articulation requirement,
the Commission's attempt to clarify retroactively its order twenty years
later was insufficient. 283 The question of immunity was a legal ques-
tion which turned on the objective question of whether the state's
policy to create exclusive service territories had been stated with
sufficient clarity in 1972 rather than on the unexpressed subjective
intent of the Commission.'"
Columbia Steel Casting nicely illustrates the necessity for particular-
ized agency approval in establishing state policy with respect to
specific private anticompetitive arrangements. To ask whether the
Commission's approval of the exchange of facilities in that case was
more appropriately viewed as part of the clear articulation require-
279
 Metro Mobil, 661 F. Stipp. al 1512.
289
 ill F.3(1 at 1427.
2$i 'The court stated:
[Slincethe Oregon statute speaks solely of authorizing the OPUC to approve
exclusive service territories, the state's clearly articulated policy is to have the OPUC
decide whether to sanction anticompetitive conduct. It follows, therefore, that we must
look to the decisions of the OPUC to determine whether PGE's conduct was part of a
clearly articulated slate polity.
Id. at 143713,8 (emphasis added).
282 Id. at 1441-12.
28] Id.
284 See id.
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ment or the active supervision requirement was a meaningless inquiry
because both prongs of the Midcal test are directed to the same end—
that is, to ensure that the specific details of private anticompetitive
arrangements have been examined and approved in advance by an
institution of state government having state law authority to establish
state policy With respect to the matter in question. In Columbia Steel
Casting, the state legislature generally had authorized the Commission
to approve exclusive service territories, and thus, no issue of the utility
commission's authority to establish state policy in this respect was pre-
sented. However, such broad declarations of state policy are in-
sufficient under the Court's immunity doctrine to delegate the power
to restrain trade to private parties. In addition, an authorized state
policymaker must prospectively approve the details of the particular
private anticompetitive arrangement at issue. Whether this is viewed
as active supervision of private conduct or as the agency's clear articu-
lation of the details of state regulatory policy has no significance pro-
vided that the state or its official delegate deliberately has approved
the specific private arrangement in advance.
C. Retroactive Statements of Agency Policy
The statutory mandate of an agency may be ambiguous on
whether the agency's delegated authority was intended to permit the
authorization of particular types of anticompetitive conduct. Even
where the agency's delegated authority is clear, its regulations and
guidelines may not be. Under general administrative law principles,
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory authorization is
entitled to considerable deference if it represents a reasonable view of
legislative intent. 285 Moreover, an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is normally controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or
inconsistenu with the regulation. "286 On their face, these principles
potentially conflict with the Supreme Court's requirement that state
authorization of anticompetitive conduct must be clear for Parker im-
munity to apply. This tension has produced a conflict of authority in
the federal courts of appeals on whether an agency's subsequent
clarification of state policy may satisfy either the clear authorization or
active supervision components of the Midcal test.
Irt Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power CI' Light Co., for example, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a territorial allocation
2e5 chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
286 Praxait; 64 F.3(1 al 611
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among utilities was entitled to antitrust immunity because it was a
"logical interpretation". of the Commission's 1965 order of ap-
proval.287 Additionally, the court held that even if the 1965 order did
not clearly include the area in question, the conduct of the parties
and the Commission since that time was consistent with the conclu-
sion that it had been included. 288 The court relied on a 1989 declara-
tion by the Commission that the territory had been allocated to one
of the utilities by the 1965 order, and on the administrative law prin-
ciple that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation normally is
entitled to controlling weight. 289
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a diametri-
cally opposed conclusion in Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen-
eral Electric Co.29° Portland General Electric ("PGE") and Pacific Power
and Light ("PPL") long had competed for electric customers in the
City of Portland. In 1972 they unsuccessfully sought city approval for
the allocation of exclusive service territories. 291 The city approved an
exchange of facilities between the utilities for the purpose of eliminat-
ing duplication.292 However, it explicitly rejected the request for an
allocation of exclusive service territories. Instead, the city specified
that both companies would continue to have non-exclusive franchises
and be obligated to supply power throughout the city. 293 The utilities
entered an agreement for the exchange of plant and property in the
city and obtained approval of the agreement from the state public
utilities commission. 294
 The order of approval did not mention exclu-
sive service territories. 295 After approval was obtained, the utilities ex-
changed facilities and customers in the designated territories and
stopped competing with each othen 296
In 1989, fifteen years after the order of approval was obtained,
Columbia unsuccessfully attempted to obtain lower priced power
from PPL rather than from PGE. PGE refused to wheel the power on
287 Id. at 613.
285 Id. at 613-14. The order in question approved several territorial agreements be-
tween the utilities as shown on maps attached to the agreements. A map of the county in
question was not included. but the companies' approved! application to the Commission
included a composite map showing a boundary that included the county. Id.
289 Id.
290 111 F.3(1 at 1427.
291
 Id. at 1433.
292 Id.
293 id.
26` 1 Id. at 1434.
293 Columbia Steel Casting, Ill F.3d at 1434.
296 Id. at 1435.
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the ground that the 1972 order bad created exclusive service territo-
ries.297 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected PGE's
claim of Parker immunity based on the 1972 order, which it held had
not clearly authorized the creation of exclusive service territories.m
The court accorded no weight to post-1972 orders of the Commission
that appeared to have recognized that exclusive service territories had
been created in 1972, nor to an order of the Commission issued after
the litigation was commenced reciting that the Commission had in-
tended to create exclusive service territories in 1972 and amending
the 1972 order nunc pro tune. 299 The court held that the question was
not whether the Commission subjectively had intended to create ex-
clusive service territories in 1972 but whether it had clearly articu-
lated a policy to do so at that time."° Reversing its own earlier opinion
that had reached precisely the opposite result,m the court concluded
that the 1972 order had not been sufficiently "clear" even though the
allocation of exclusive territories arguably had been a foreseeable
consequence of the 1972 order. 302
The general approach to agency interpretations of broadly
worded statutes or clarifications of ambiguous agency orders and
regulations taken by the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Steel Casting clearly
is more consistent with the Supreme Court's Parker decisions than that
of the Eleventh Circuit in Praxair. The ultimate question for Packer
immunity purposes is not simply whether state law authority in fact
exists for the conduct in question but whether that policy was articu-
lated by an authoritative state policy maker clearly and in advance of
the particular anticompetitive conduct at issue. 303 To permit an
agency retrospectively to immunize private anticompetitive conduct
by "clarifying" state policy after the conduct at issue had occurred
would frustrate the core purpose of the clear articulation require-
ment—to assure that departures from the federal pro-competition
norm are the result of the deliberate decision of an authorized state
policymaker. It would also obscure the visibility of agency approvals of
297 hi.
2" Id. at 1437.
29° Id. at 1440,1441-42.
3'x' Carinthia Steel Casting, 1 1 1 F.3d at 1442.
341 See Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 60 E3d 1390 (9th Cir.
1995), withdrawn, 103 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1096), rehg denied, 1 11 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998).
3°2 Columbia Steel Casting, Ill F.3d at 1442-44. Sec also California CNG, 96 F.3d at 1193,
discussed sterna notes 217-222 and accompanying text.
3°3 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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private anticompetitive conduct and threaten the norms of prospec-
tivity and specificity that undergird the Court's Parker immunity doc-
trine. To accord private immunity on the basis of such retrospective
declarations of state policy would disrupt justifiable private reliance
on the presumptive norm of free competition and conflict with the
Supreme Court's repeated admonitions that a state may not confer
immunity, either by generally authorizing private parties to engage in
anticompetitive conduct or by ratifying such conduct after it has oc-
curred.
That being said, however, it would be erroneous to conclude, as
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested in Columbia Steel
Casting, that no Parker immunity ever can result from sequential
clarifications of agency orders and rules. It also would be incorrect to
conclude that an agency must clearly articulate the specifics of its an-
ticompetitive policy once and for all at the outset rather than on the
basis of accumulated experience and enhanced expertise. The entire
range of an agency's policy declarations and actions must be consid-
ered in determining whether it has clearly expressed an intent to
authorize particular anticompetitive conduct at:any given moment in
time. Thus, the key factor in Columbia Steel Casting should not have
been whether the state public utility commission's 1972 order in itself
clearly expressed the Commission's intent to authorize exclusive serv-
ice territories but whether that order, together with its subsequent
interpretations and applications by the Commission, clearly evidenced
that intent at some time before the particular anticompetitive conduct at is-
sue—namely, the refusal of PCT' to wheel power purchased from PPL by the
plaintiff—took place. In this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit placed too little weight on subsequent commission orders that
appeared to recognize the existence of exclusive service territories,
the emergence of which arguably had been the clearly foreseeable
result of the exchange of facilities authorized by the 1972 order. 304 By
contrast, the court's refusal to accord weight to the Commission's
post-litigation nunc pro illtic amendment of its 1972 order was justified
because that order was issued after all of the events that gave rise to
the litigation had occurred.3°5
To say that the Commission's post-litigation amendment of its
1972 order was ineffective to confer immunity on PGE's refusal to
wheel power from PPL obviously does not mean that the order was
5" See Columbia Steel Casting, 111 F.3d at 1990.
305 Id. at 1441-42.
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void or of no effect. With respect to all conduct occurring after the
date of the order, the creation of exclusive service territories in the
City of Portland was an established, clearly articulated, and actively
supervised state policy, fully entitled to the benefit of the Parker im-
munity doctrine.
D. Rulemaking, Adjudication, and Tatiff Approval
State agencies may act through rulemakings, adjudications, or
hybrid proceedings such as tariff approvals, which may be conducted
"on the record" using quasi-adjudicatory procedures, but which are
treated as "legislative" proceedings for some purposes." 8 The role
that each of these types of proceedings should have in the application
of the Parker doctrine has not to date received the focused attention
that it deserves.
Where a state agency proceeds in a truly adjudicatory fashion for
the purpose of determining whether previous anticompetitive con-
duct by a private actor should be sanctioned because it was contrary
to established norms," 7 the agency's ultimate determination that the
conduct in question was consistent with state law should not provide a
basis for antitrust immunity. That result would be contrary to the
norms of general applicability and prospectivity that underlie the
Parker doctrine.808 In effect, in such cases, the agency has merely
ratified private anticompetitive conduct after it has occurred. This is
contrary to the Supreme Court's repeated decisions that only private
anticompetitive conduct that is specifically and clearly approved in
advance as an authorized implementation of a general state policy is
exempt from the antitrust laws.
That is not to say that the results of state administrative adjudica-
tions may never be significant in determining whether state action
antitrust immunity exists. Although they do not customarily do so,
federal and state agencies occasionally may exercise their discretion to
articulate broad propositions of policy, applicable not only to the pre-
sent but to future cases, in the course of their adjudication of a par-
ticular dispute."8 While those broad declarations of state policy can-
not provide a basis for Parker immunity with respect to private conduct
300
 See generally, e.g.,Premis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
307 See, e.g., DAvis & PIERCE, .supra note 278, at § 6.1.
308 See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
509 See, e.g, DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 278, at § 6.8; see also California CNC, 96 E3d at
1197-1200.
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that already has occurred, they should provide a sufficient clear ar-
ticulation of state policy to support a claim of immunity for the future,
provided that particular anticompetitive arrangements entered pur-
suant to that policy receive active state review and approval before
they take effect.
By contrast to administrative adjudications, state administrative
rulemaking proceedings and policy declarations are the paradigm
example of administrative action that may constitute a sufficient clear
articulation of state policy to support a claim of Parker immunity. This
is so for either private or local governmental conduct taken pursuant
to those policies, limited only by the scope of the agency's policymak-
ing authority as a matter of state law.") In the case of private action,
however, such broad administrative determinations of state policy
cannot, standing alone, establish that particular private transactions
or arrangements are immune. The Supreme Court has established
that private anticompetitive conduct is entitled to Parker immunity
only if its particular details are approved in advance by a state actor
possessing state law authority to grant such approval. 3" Thus, a fur-
ther round of agency approval of the particular transaction or tariff
must be obtained before it is entered or implemented if a claim of
Parker immunity is to be Opheld. 312
The most difficult questions in this area arise not from the effects
of broad administrative rulemakings or specific administrative adjudi-
catory proceedings, but rather, from the pervasive actions of state
agencies in dealing with tariffs governing the rates and practices of
regulated industries. Because a tariff is the product of purely private
action, it is clear that it provides no basis for a claim of immunity sim-
310 See supra notes 209-238 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 74-113 and accompanying text.
312 In some settings, declarations of statewide policy by a state agency might be imple-
mented in particular transactions by Municipalities or other local governmental units. CI
Lender's Serv., Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 429 (SD. Ohio 1991) (holding that
local bar association's implementation of policy on unauthorized practice of law adopted
by Ohio Supreme Court immune). As the Supreme Court has indicated in its municipal
action decisions, those local implementations of state policy should themselves be antitrust
immune without any further requirement of active supervision by the state agency. The
Supreme Court's rationale for this result, however, is unsatisfactory. State-wide supervision
is unnecessary in such cases, not because local governmental units are more likely to act in
the "public interest" than private actors so far as their anticompetitive commercial ar-
rangements are concerned, but because those local units of stale government possess the
authority, as a matter of state law, to determine the particulars of previously articulated
state policy as it is locally , applied.
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ply because it is filed with a state agency.sn And where the agency ul-
timately fails to approve the tariff, of course, there would be no basis
in state policy for a claim of immunity with respect to such purely pri-
vate cotiduct. 3"
Some litigants have attempted to finesse this difficulty by arguing
that such filed tariffs should be covered by the immunity accorded to
private petitioning activities under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
which the Supreme Court extended to petitioning directed at judicial
and administrative action in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited. 315 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, however, the No-
err doctrine is a corollary of Parker, designed to protect the immunity
accorded to completed governmental action that results from private
petitioning. 816 Accordingly, courts have rejected claims of Noerr im-
munity for filed tariffs where no valid claim of Parker immunity for the
anticompetitive impact of the tariff itself could be sustained. Antitrust
liability in such cases is not imposed on the act of petitioning but on a
private actor's marketplace implementation of the anticompetitive
and non-immune tariff provision itself.
For example, in Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co.,317 AT&T claimed that its tariff filed with the ICC requiring
competitors to use an uneconomical protective device to connect to
AT&T's network was a protected "request for governmental action." 3"
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected that claim be-
cause the requirement had been imposed by AT&T, not the FCC. 319
More recently, in the context of state agency action, the Court of Ap-
peals for the . Ninth Circuit, in California CNG, rejected a claim that a
filed tariff adequately evidenced state policy in favor of utility rate-
payer subsidization of natural gas refueling stations both because the
tariff did not clearly show that it was non-compensatory and because
the record did not show that the state public utilities commission had
► 3 See, e.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel, Co., 700 F. 2c1 785, 807 (2d Cir.
1983); Capital Freight Scry., Inc. v. Trailer Marine Transp. Co ► p., 704 F. Stipp. 1190, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
314 Even where the tariff is ultimately approved by the agency, claims of antitrust im-
munity for implementation of the tariff or arrangement before it has been approved
should be rejected. This result is compelled by the norm of prospectivity underlying Parker
immunity doctrine and by the Supreme Court's clear holdings that state ratification of
anticompetitive private conduct cannot provide a basis for immunity.
515 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
316 Omni, 499 U.S. at 383.
S17
 700 F.2c1 at 785.
Sl" Id, at 808-09.
319 Id, al 807.
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approved it.320 In Columbia Steel Casting, the same court held that ap-
plying to an administrative agency for approval of an anticompetitive
contract is not protected by Noerr. 321
The sanie principle—that Noerr immunity for the proposal of a
tariff to a state agency does not support a claim of Parker immunity for
its marketplace implementation—no doubt underlies a series of deci-
sions refusing to recognize either Noerr or Parker immunity for "price
squeezes" alleged to have resulted from approval of a utility's retail
rates by a state utilities commission and its wholesale rates by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission.322 The rationale for these deci-
sions has been that because neither agency has jurisdiction over both
ends of the price squeeze, neither the clear articulation nor the active
supervision requirement is satisfied. This result is open to question,
however, where the state agency can be shown actually to have consid-
ered the relationship of wholesale and retail rates in its approval of
the retail tariff over which it did have jurisdiction. 323 In such cases, the
state agency has approved the tariff at issue and the only question is
whether that approval reflects a clearly articulated state policy.
The most difficult issue of state action immunity for conduct
regulated by state administrative agencies remains—namely, whether
32° California CNG, 96 F.3d at 1201. •
"' 1 1 1 F.3d at 1446 ("PGE is not being held liable for filing the application that re-
sulted in the 1972 Order. PGE is being held liable for agreeing with PP & L to replace
competition with area monopolies in the Portland market.").
322 See City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Ca., 671 F.2(1 1173, 1179-80 (8th Gr. 1982), cm.
denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976,
985 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); City of Mishawaka v. Indiana &
Elec. Co„ 560 F.2c1 1314, 1318-21 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978). But see
Noreen Energy Resource Ltd. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CU) 1 70,
851 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Noreen, the court declined to recognize a "price squeeze" excep-
tion to Noerr immunity. The court further held that Parker protected the defendant's activi-
ties, because both the "postage stamp rates" and "crossover ban" for intrastate gas transpor-
tation at issue in that case were within the regulatory jurisdiction of the CPUC. This is
unlike the situation in City of Kirkwood, where defendants were alleged to have been able to
manipulate the regulatory structure to impose a price squeeze by virtue of the fact that the
wholesale rates at issue were within the regulatory jurisdiction of FERC, whereas the retail
rates were within the jurisdiction of the state.
323 cf. Cine 42nd Street Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1046-
47 (2d On 1986) (stating that immunity extends to impact of state-approved conduct in
unregulated markets where those effects were clearly foreseeable); Metro Mobil, 661 F.
Supp. at 1504 (stating that Parker immunity extends to price squeeze effects of regulated
wholesale rates even though retail rates not regulated where the stale commission took
account of those effects in approving wholesale rates); Sonitrol of Fresno, Inc. v. American
Tel. & Telegraph Co., 629 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating that immunity ex-
tends to impact of state-approved conduct in unregulated markets where those effects
were clearly foreseeable).
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immunity should be accorded to anticompetitive actions pursuant to a
privately proposed tariff that has become effective under state law.
The Supreme Court has twice rejected immunity in such circum-
stances, despite the fact that the approval at issue was specific and
prospective and that the utility not only was permitted but was re-
quired by state law to comply with the tariff it had filed.
The Court's first important decision rejecting immunity for pri-
vate actions pursuant to an approved filed tariff that had gone into
effect was issued before the Court's final re-articulation of the state
action doctrine in Midcal. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., the Court re-
jected a claim of immunity for Detroit Edison's program providing
"free" light bulbs as part of its tariffed electric service.'" A majority of
the Court rejected the utility's claim of immunity on the ground that,
even though it had approved the tariff, the Michigan Public Service
Commission had given no focused attention to the light bulb pro-
gratis, which "[did] not, therefore, implement any statewide policy ?elating to
light bulbs."325 Following Midcal, the Court again rejected a claim of
Parker inununity for rates established by a filed tariff in Ticon326 The
Court did so on the ground that ; under the "negative option" system
of regulation followed by two of the states, the rates at issue had be-
come effective when the concerned state agencies had failed to dis-
approve them within a certain time after they were filed, despite the
failure of the rating bureaus to provide the agencies with additional
information that they had requested. In the Court's view, the states
had not satisfied the second prong of the Midcal test because they had
not "actively supervised" the particular rates at issue before they be-
came effective." 7 To meet this requirement, the state must exercise
"sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of
the rates or prices have been established as a product of deliberate state in-
tervention, not simply by agreement among private parties."528
Broadly read, these decisions suggest Parker immunity arises only
if the state agency has affirmatively considered and deliberately
adopted a policy of statewide application in favor of private anticom-
petitive conduct of the type at issue. Furthermore, they suggest that
innnunity obtains only if the state agency has affirmatively approved
the specifics of each Fivate anticompetitive arrangement entered
324 428 U.S. at 579.
323 Id. at. 585 (emphasis added).
326 504 U.S. at 621.
327 Id. at 639-40.
328 Id. at 634-35 (emphasis added).
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pursuant to that policy. But other readings also are possible. Ticor did
not present any issue of broad state policy because state laws in that
case clearly authorized collective ratemaking. 329 Nor did it involve any
affirmative approval of the particular rates at issue because the "nega-
tive option" systems of regulation at issue permitted privately pro-
posed rates to go into effect automatically without any requirement
for affirmative agency consideration or approval . 3" Thus, one can ar-
gue that Ticor supports the conclusion that any rates or practices that
are affirmatively approved by a state agency—even if only summarily
and with no indication of reasons—are immune. Additionally, al-
though Cantor clearly did require more than simple approval of a pri-
vate tariff to support a Parker immunity claim, that decision was issued
when the mode of analysis of Parker claims was still in flux. After the
Court later settled on the two-pronged clear articulation and active
supervision test in Midcal, it can be argued that affirmative agency
approval of a tariff's specific terms should alone be held to satisfy
both prongs of the Parker immunity test and that it would be unfair to
subject a private party to antitrust liability for its state-required com-
pliance with the terms of its filed tariff.
The norms of Parker immunity suggest that this "tariff approval
equals antitrust immunity" approach should continue to be rejected
by the Court as it was in Cantor: A fundamental premise of the Su-
preme Court's Parker decisions has been that only a deliberately
adopted and generally applicable state policy sanctioning a particular
type of anticompetitive conduct can support a claim of Parker immu-
nity. Where, as in Cantor; neither the state legislature nor the agency
acting within the scope of its delegated authority has articulated such
a policy with respect to the type of anticompetitive conduct at issue,
the agency's unelaborated approval of a specific tariff proposed by a
private party cannot support a Parker immunity claim because no such
deliberate and generally applicable policy has ever existed. 531
That does not imply, however, that a state agency's approval of a
specific tariff never may support a Parker immunity claim. In instances
where the state legislature has itself articulated a generally applicable
and prospective state policy sanctioning a particular type of anticom-
petitive conduct, the agency's only role is to supervise the implemen-
329
 Id. at 629.
s" Id. at 638.
331 See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. CO., 664 F.2d 716, 733 (9th Cir. 1981)
("The FCC does not expressly approve or adopt as agency policy the content of every tariff
it permits to become effective.").
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tation of that policy by approving particular private anticompetitive
arrangements or tariffs. For example, in Southern Motor Carriers, legis-
latures in three of the states in question specifically had approved the
practice of collective ratemaking. 332 That being the case, state agency
approval of a particular jointly proposed rate, even if that approval
was given without articulation of reasons, was sufficient to confer im-
munity because the agency's only function was to supervise the par-
ticular tariffs that had been jointly proposed. Similarly, in Tian; state
statutes clearly authorized the operation of private rating bureaus for
the purpose of fixing rates for title search and examination services.s"
The state agencies' specific consideration and approval of particular
rates proposed by the bureaus therefore would have been antitrust
immune had the agencies affirmatively considered and approved
those particular rates.
By contrast,' the legislature of the fourth state in Southern Motor
Carriers had not affirmatively approved collective ratemaking. 334 As a
result, any state policy permitting such anticompetitive conduct was
articulated by the agency itself. Absent the agency's explicit and clear
articulation of a generally applicable policy sanctioning such conduct,
even its affirmative approval of a privately proposed collective tariff
should have been insufficient to confer immunity. Just as in Cantor,
the agency's bare approval of the terms of a particular tariff in such
cases in itself provides insufficient evidence that the agency has
adopted a considered state policy generally permitting collective ra-
temaking by private parties.
The rejection of Parker immunity based on an agency's tariff ap-
proval standing alone in cases in which neither the agency nor the
state legislature has prospectively and clearly articulated a generally
applicable policy sanctioning the type of anticompetitive conduct at
issue does not imply that a state agency's process of tariff approval
may never support an antitrust immunity claim. If, in the course of its
approval of a particular tariff, a state agency, acting within the scope
of its delegated authority under state law, articulates a generally appli-
cable and prospective policy in favor of the type of anticompetitive
conduct at issue, that general declaration of policy should suffice to
support the application of the Parker doctrine. This is the case not
only with respect to the future conduct of the tariff proponent in ac-
332 Southern Motor Carrie's, 471 U.S. at 63.
3" Thor, 504 U.S. at 629.
3 :4 Southern Motor Carrieis, 471 U.S. at 63-65.
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cordance with its terms but with respect to the agency's approval of
similar tariffs subsequently proposed by others as well.
E. The Effect of Illegality Under State Law
Whether the state law illegality of the regulations or activities at
issue should affect the availability of Parker immunity has proved a
vexing question. Because Parker immunity rests on the idea that Con-
gress did not intend to subject the acts of states as sovereigns to the
proscriptions of the antitrust laws, it is logical to think that private or
municipal conduct that exceeds the scope of state law authorization
should not be entitled to immunity.335
 By the same token, if the con-
duct at issue has not been authorized by the state, one might con-
clude that it cannot have been taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy as Midcal requires.
Just as the concept of official authority has proved elusive in areas
as diverse as the scope of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit in federal court, 338
 the state action component of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 337
 the availability of a civil rights cause of action
against municipalities under section 1983, 338
 and the scope of officer
immunity from personal damages liability for official conduct, 339 so it
has eluded clear definition in the development of the Parker doctrine.
Leading commentators have argued that to subject the availability of
Parker immunity to an assessment of the legality of conduct under
state law would turn federal rather than state courts into routine re-
viewers of the legality of state governmental conduct. 'Q Thus, they
have suggested that "ordinary" or routine errors of judgment in the
application of state law should not defeat Parker immunity, implicitly
leaving open the possibility that "obvious" or "extreme" departures
from state substantive or procedural requirements might have that
"9 See, e.g., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1981); Feminist Women's Health Ctn. Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978).
"9 Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), with Penithurst State Sch. & llosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).,
337 See generally Home Td. & Telegraph, Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
"9 See generally, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Molten v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
"9 Compare Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
.340 See 1 PHILLIP AREE DA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 424 (rev. ed.
1997).
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effect."' This view quickly was accepted by federal antitrust courts,
which, quite understandably, were reluctant to thrust themselves into
the maw of difficult questions of abuse of state authority. 342
In Omni Outdoor Advertising, the Supreme Court strongly en-
dorsed this trend, holding that allegations that members of the City
Council had conspired with a billboard company to enact a zoning
ordinance that protected the company from competition by the plain-
tiff, rather than to promote the public interest as required by state
law, were insufficient to defeat a claim of Parker immunity 343 It was
sufficient that state law conferred power on the city to enact zoning
ordinances, the very purpose of which was "to displace unfettered
business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of prevent-
ing normal acts of competition, particularly on the part of new en-
trants." 44 The Court also rejected as impractical and beyond the pur-
pose of the antitrust laws any exceptions to Parker based on the
alleged existence of a "conspiracy" with private parties, the "corrup-
tion" of public officials, or where, in connection with the governmen-
tal action in question, "bribery or some other violation of state or fed-
eral law has been established." This might vindicate principles of good
government, but it was beyond the purposes of the antitrust laws. As
applied in subsequent decisions, Omni has had the effect of im ► uniz-
ing municipal conduct so long as the state has provided the city with a
"general grant of authority to take actions of the sort in question," eve»
though the manner of their exercise was substantively or procedurally
improper. 345
There is. a certain irony to this view. The central purpose and ef-
fect of Midcats clear articulation requirement was to limit the avail-
ability of Parker immunity to a narrower subset of the universe of all
authorized state action. To be entitled to immunity, private or mu-
nicipal conduct must not merely have been authorized by the state,
but clearly authorized. The effect of the view that federal courts
should not ordinarily review the state law legality of private or mu-
nicipal conduct in determining whether it is antitrust in ► mne is to
'in Id. at 429, 437, 465-66.
342 See, e.g., Nugget Hydroelectric, 981 F.2d at 434-35; Traweck v. City & County of San
Francisco, 920 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 1990); Oberndorf v. City & County of Denver, 900
F.2d 1434 (16th Cir. 1990); Boone v. Redevelopment Agency, 841 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir.
1988); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987); Han-
cock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987).
343 499 U.S. at 365.
344 Id, at 373.
' 345 Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 956 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1992).
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broaden the scope of state action antitrust immunity to conduct that
was never properly authorized by the state at all, and thus, to remove
it from the mooring of state sovereign authority that provides the es-
sential underpinning of Parker.
That being said, the Supreme Court was correct in concluding
that the concept of state law authority is sufficiently malleable to ex-
clude ordinary errors of judgment in applying state law, and that the
purposes of the Parker doctrine do not require such review. If the state
as sovereign has clearly authorized municipalities or private parties to
engage in certain types of anticompetitive conduct provided that cer-
tain legal or factual conditions are present, it has made a considered
decision to displace competitive norms to that extent. Both practical-
ity and respect for the competence of state institutions suggest that
once that basic policy determination has been made, the existence of
the subordinate conditions of state authorization be entrusted to state
institutions.
Moreover, given the general recognition that private parties are
not properly held liable for damages for their justifiable reliance on
apparently valid authorizations of their conduct, 346 and the sweeping
protection of municipalities and state agencies from damages liability
under the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 547 and the Elev-
enth Amendment, respectively, the only issue at stake in such cases is
whether a prospective injunction should issue based on alleged viola-
tions of state law. In such circumstances, there is a strong argument
that a stay of the federal action would be appropriate based on pri-
mary jurisdiction348
 or abstention 349 prinCiples to permit state agen-
cies and courts to resolve subordinate issues of state law within their
primary areas of competence and expertise.
Nevertheless, it is much too easy to read Omni as holding that any
sort of federal judicial review for consistency with state law is inappro-
priate in determining questions of state action antitrust immunity.
3.16 See, e.g, Yeager!' Fuel, 22 F.3d at 1269 (holding that fact that state PUC later prohib-
ited parts of energy conservation program that utility reasonably had concluded were
proper at the time that it acted does not negate Parker immunity); Lease Lights, inc. v.
Public Serv. Co., 849 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing defense where party rea-
sonably relies on exercise of state authority later determined to be unauthorized).
117 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994).
w See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Cu., 539 F.2d 418, 423-24 (5th
Cir. 1976). But see Industrial Communications Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Telegraph Co., 505 ,
F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1974) (ordering primary jurisdiction reference to state PUC). See gener-
ally FLOYD & SULLIVAN, unpin note 88, at § 3.4.11.
" See generally FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 88, at § 2.6.
September 2000]	 State Agencies and Antitrust Immunity 	 1131
This truly would stand Parker on its head. Even the strongest advocates
of federal deference to state processes of review have contended only
that "ordinary" errors in the application of state law should be placed
off limits. 35° Whether an authorized state actor has adopted a getter-
ally applicable state policy with respect to the type of anticompetitive
conduct at issue is central to the application of Parker and must be
open to federal judicial review in every case involving a Parker immu-
nity claim. If it has not, then obviously the actions of municipalities
and private parties allegedly pursuant to that policy exceed the scope
of their state law authority, and even more obviously, have not been
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated policy of the state. 551
Thus, in applying Omni's disclaimer of federal authority to review
questions of illegality under state law, a distinction must be drawn be-
tween the fundamental questions of (1) whether a state policymaker
acting within the sphere of its state law authority has articulated a
generally applicable anticompetition policy with respect to certain
types of private or municipal conduct and has approved the applica-
tion of that policy in advance and in specific detail; (2) the correct-
ness of its determinations of the subordinate questions of fact or
judgment that bring that policy into play; 352 and (3) questions of in-
consistency with other provisions of state law that are not addressed to
the state's competition policy per Se. 353 Omni should be read to pre-
cluck federal review only of questions falling into the last two catego-
ries, not those in the first, which go to the heart of the Parker immu-
nity doctrine. If, however, authorized state policymakers have made
the requisite "clear statement" and provided the necessary prospective
and specific approval, the purposes of the Parker doctrine have been
served, even if they may have erred in exercising their authority as a
matter of state law.
35o
	 supra note 341.
351 c f Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 GAR-
nozo L. Ray. 989, 991 (1999) (argtting that Chevron deference should not be accorded to
agency interpretations of their jurisdictional authority).
352 See, e.g., Nugget Hydroelechic, 981 F.2d at 434-35; Traurek, 920 17.2d at 592; Oberndorf,
900 F.2d at 1434; Boone, 841 F.2d at 891; Kern-Tulare, 828 F.2d at 514; Hancock hulas., 811
F.2d at 225.
s" See, e.g, Kern-Tulare, 828 F.2d at 514; Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist. v. City of Talla-
hassee, 788 F.2(1 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Clearly, for example, where state law fails to authorizes 54 or pro-
hibits355
 certain types of anticompetitive activities, such as exclusive
trash hauling arrangements, a municipality's determination to engage
in such activities or to authorize private parties to do so is notentitled
to Parker immunity because it is not authorized by state law. By con-
trast, if the state has authorized municipalities to approve exclusive
trash hauling arrangements where the public health requires, claims
that a municipality's determination that the public health required a
particular arrangement was erroneous, violated state law "open meet-
ing" requirements, was procedurally defective, or was arbitrary and
capricious should be insulated from federal judicial review. That is
because those questions are not addressed to the fundamental issue of
state policy that gives rise to Parker immunity and because it would be
impractical and inappropriate for federal courts to step into the shoes
of state institutions in determining such subordinate questions of
state law.
This analysis suggests that federal antitrust review of the state law
legality of the anticompetitive actions of state administrative agencies
should differ significantly depending upon the scope of the agency's
policymaking authority under state law. Where an agency simply im-
plements an anticompetition policy adopted by the state legislature,
its subordinate factual and judgmental determinations leading it to
adopt certain rules or to approve particular private anticompetitive
tariffs or arrangements as consistent with that legislative policy should
be insulated from federal judicial review under the Parker doctrine. By
contrast, where, as is commonly the case, the agency itself is the state
policymaker with respect to the matter in question, the underlying
354 American Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. North Am. Indus., 772 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding that New York legislature had not expressed policy to displace competition
with regulation in the provision of pay phone service where it had only imposed minimum
service requirements and otherwise left pay phones unregulated), amended, 783 F.
Stipp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (pervasive state regulation of interconnection does not author-
ize discriminatory denial of interconnection); Laidlaw Waste. Sys., Inc. v. City of Fort Smith,
742 F. Supp. 540 (WD. Ark. 1990) (holding that even though city had authority to enter
waste disposal business and grant exclusive franchises, it exceeded authority in a way not
contemplated by the legislature when it chose to compete with a private company and
charge it higher landfill rates than it charged itself; the legislature did not intend to
authorize unfair competition).
555
 See, e.g., Cost Management Servs., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937,
942 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that defendant utility's off-tariff pricing of natural gas was not
immune if, as plaintiff alleged, it was prohibited by state law); Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v.
Butts County, 855 F. Stipp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that state law did not allow local
governments to exclude all competition in waste disposal market).
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question of the scope of its state law policymaking authority should be
fully open to federal review—no matter how difficult that determina-
tion may be. It would be a contradiction in terms to accord Parker
immunity to state agency policy that it lacked authority to adopt or to
private anticompetitive activity that it lacked the power to approve.
This view may help to explain the result in Goldfarb, where the Su-
preme Court declined to recognize immunity for the state bar's en-
forcement of minimum fee schedules adopted by local bar associa-
tions. 356 Although the bar was a state agency, it had acted in direct
contradiction of the opinions of the Virginia Supreme Court, which
exercised the ultimate regulatory authority of the state over the prac-
tice of law, stating that lawyers should not be controlled by fee sched-
ules.557
Of course, in many cases, private parties will have relied on osten-
sibly valid state agency authorizations of private anticompetitive ar-
rangements. The courts have resolved this dilemma by holding that
private parties who justifiably rely on ostensibly valid regulatory
authority approving their anticompetitive activities should be insu-
lated from damages liability. 358
III. CATEGORIZING DEFENDANTS
The approach advocated here necessarily involves the federal an-
titrust court in determining the locus and scope of policymaking
authority as a matter of state law. Most importantly, because the scope
of Parker immunity for the actions of state governmental entities
would turn on whether they exercise policymaking authority with re-
spect to the state as a whole, the suggested approach requires the an-
titrust court to distinguish agencies exercising statewide authority
from municipalities, counties, and special purpose governmental
units exercising only local authority.
In most instances, the answer to this question will be obvious
from express geographic restrictions on a governmental entity's
156 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 773.
357 Id. at 770, 789-90.
968 See l'eagrr's Fuel, 22 F.3d at 1269 (holding that fad that state public utilities commis-
sion later prohibited parts of energy conservation prograin that utility had reasonably con-
cluded were proper at die time that it acted does not negate Parker immunity); Ticor Tide
Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade Conmen, 922 F.2d 1122 (3rd Cir. 1990) (stating that even if regu-
lation of attorney lees related to title insurance transactions not authorized, private defen-
dants should be immune from damages liability becattse they reasonably relied on appar-
ently lawful assertion of regulatory authority), reir'd, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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authority. In others, the question may be more difficult. For example,
a state airport or port authority may appear to operate only in the
particular area of the major port or airport that it supervises, but
those areas may involve, policy determinations that have a statewide
impact and are of statewide concern. In such instances, other factors,
such as the appointment of the agency's members by the governor,
legislature, or other statewide officials and statewide funding and su-
pervision of the agency's operations, may prove decisive. Eleventh
Amendment authority also may provide useful guidance in the Parker
context559
 because it utilizes a similar distinction between state agen-
cies and local governmental units, which has only occasionally caused
difficulty.560
 Additional guidance may be drawn from decisions under
the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (the "Act"), which ex-
tends its protection from antitrust damages liability to "any local gov-
ernment, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capac-
ity."561
 The legislative history of the Act indicates that such local
governmental entities "would have a geographic jurisdiction that is
not contiguous with, and is generally substantially smaller than, that
of the state that established it."362
The suggested approach also will require the antitrust court to
distinguish between public state agencies, which would be subject to
neither the clear articulation nor the active supervision requirements
when acting within the scope of their state law policymaking authority,
and private actors, who would continue to be subject to both re-
quirements. In view of the frequency with which parties having con-
tinuing private interests are called upon to serve on state agencies,
boards, and commissions, this is a potentially much more difficult
question than the distinction between state and local governmental
units.363 This question, however, is inherent in the Supreme Court's
3" See, e.g., Varian v. City of Harrisburg, 661 F. Stipp. 596, 602 (M.D. Penn. 1087) (rely-
ing on Eleventh Amendment precedents in determining that a redevelopment authority
was a municipal rather than a state agency).
360 See supra note 45.
361 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1994).
362 H.R. REP. No. 965, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4620-21. See, e.g., 1T&E
Overseas, Inc. v RCA Global Communications, Inc., 747 F. Stipp. 6, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1990)
(concluding that the Guam Telephone Authority was not protected by the Act because it
exercised statewide jurisdiction). See generally FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 88, at § 4.2.
343 See, e.g., Fades v. State Rd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir.
1998) (treating the board as a state agency fir both Eleventh Amendment and Parker pur-
poses even though its membership was composed entirely of competing members of the
profession); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential Property & Casualty Joint Underwriting
Ass'n, 137 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1998) (treating association as a public entity despite its
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consistent view that Parker immunity obtains only where the specific
anticompetitive conduct at issue has been prospectively approved by a
public rather than a private actor. Indeed, the distinction between
public and private action will often be more difficult to draw in the
case of municipal and other local and special purpose governmental
units than it is in the case of agencies exercising statewide jurisdiction
and policymaking authority, which almost invariably will be subject to
public appointment, supervision, and funding.s 64 Certainly the
difficulties of classification created by the focus on the official locus of
state law policymaking authority suggested here pale by comparison
with the difficulties—as well as the drastic intrusion on state sover-
eignty—posed by alternative approaches that would not respect the
policy choices of state agencies if they were determined to have been
"captured" by private interests565 or to have been "financially inter-
ested" in the result. 366 In any event, the Supreme Court now appears
to have rejected these approaches in Omni.367
private membership); Washington State Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Forrest, 930 F.2d 736
(9th Cir. 1991) (expressing doubt about whether council that enforced minimum wages
for apprentices in the perlbrmance of electrical contracts and had both public and private
members was a state agency).
364 See, e.g., Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 098 F.2d 1073 (1st Cir. 1093)
(treating a nonprofit, nunstock corporation formed by twelve municipalities to assist in
waste disposal as a public actor where its officers, by statute, were declared to he mimicipal
officers); Riverview Inv„ Inc. v. Ottawa Cully. Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474 (6th Cir.
1990) (treating local community improvement corporation having private members and
not subject to municipal control as a private entity). See generally FLOYD & SULLIVAN, ROM
note 88, at § 4.1.7 (suggesting that the focus should be on whether the actions in question
"are the actions of a body or entity created by the state that exercises policymaking or ad-
ministrative authority officially conferred by the slate and that is officially acconntable for
its actions to the state," and that in making this determination the C01111 should consider
"(1) whether the entity in question has been publicly or privately created, (2) whether its
members are publicly or privately appointed, (3) whether they arc subject to the con-
straints and regulations that apply to public employees generally, (4) the extent to which
the entity exercises functions specifically delegated to it by state law, and (5) the extent to
which its actions, even though not actively supervised, are subject to ultimate review and
control by the state").
365 See supra note 9; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 340, at 410-11 (suggest-
ing that the "state itself" designation for agencies entitled to ipso facto immunity should be
reserved for "government agencies that are both statewide in their jurisdiction and have
no particular susceptibility to capture by a particular business group" and denied to "agen-
cies that are dominated by members of the regulated industry").
366 Sec Mange, supra note 8, at 703-05 (suggesting that Parker immunity may be de-
nied to the actions of a state board consisting of affected producer, consumer, or labor
interests on the ground that they are financially interested in the result).
/67 See supra notes 343-345 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In applying the Parker doctrine, the actions of state administrative
agencies should be treated differently than those of local and special
purpose units of state governments. The basic premises underlying
the Supreme Court's Parker decisions require that anticompetitive
conduct be undertaken pursuant to a statewide policy of general ap-
plicability, and that it be approved in advance and in specific detail if
it is to be accorded an implied exemption from the facially un-
qualified national pro-competition norm. Because municipalities,
counties and other local and special purpose governmental units do
not possess state law authority to adopt policies generally applicable to
the state as a whole, their actions must be taken pursuant to a gener-
ally applicable policy adopted by an authorized state policyniaker such
as a state legislature or state agency if they are to be antitrust immune.
By contrast, state agencies frequently do possess authority, as a matter
of state law, to prescribe competition policy for the state as a whole
under general delegations of authority from the state legislature. Ac-
cordingly, the agency's clear articulation of state policy within the
scope of its delegated authority should suffice in itself to satisfy the
clear articulation component of the Parker doctrine. This theory has
been recognized by an emerging trend of authority in the courts of
appeals.
The Supreme Court's decisions do not support the conclusion
that it has incorporated a rigid view of direct "Madisonian democracy"
into the Parker doctrine or that only the state legislature is entitled to
articulate Parker-immune anticompetition policy for the state. Such a
rule would represent an unwarranted intrusion on the states' ability
to structure and implement their policymaking processes as they wish.
It also would be wholly impracticable and, would disregard the very
reasons that compel state legislatures to create state agencies and vest
them with substantial delegated policymaking authority. The clear
articulation requirement serves an important purpose in the applica-
tion of the Parker doctrine by ensuring that departures from the .pre-
sumptive federal competitive norm are authorized only as the result
of a carefully considered, deliberately adopted, and visible state policy.
That purpose, however, does not imply that only the state legislature is
entitled to make such deliberate and carefully considered policy
choices for the state. To insist that only the state legislature is entitled
to articulate state competition policy ignores the infinite gradations of
specification and degrees of articulation that typify the legislative-
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administrative relationship and insists on drawing a line that defies
meaningful definition and serves no useful purpose.
Conversely, there is no warrant for extending the same degree of
protection to local and special purpose units of state government that
do not possess state-wide policymaking authority. The Supreme
Court's decisions dealing with the important issues of federalism
posed by the Eleventh Amendment long have distinguished between
the respect owed to local governmental units, on the one hand, and
those owed to arms of the state government, such as state agencies, on
the other. Although the specific issues posed by the Parker doctrine
differ from those posed by the Eleventh Amendment, the underlying
premise that only the actions of an institution of statewide compe-
tence are of sufficient weight to justify an exemption from the su-
premacy of federal law and institutions applies equally to both. Such a
presumption is especially appropriate in the context of the Parker doc-
trine, which rests, not on any express declaration of Congressional
will, but on an implied inverse preemption of a facially unqualified
national pro-competition norm. The equation of state agencies with
local units of government would be doubly unfortunate. First, it inevi-
tably would lead to a watering down of the clear articulation require-
ment to the vanishing point in the case of the actions of local units of
government and private actors, resulting in an undue impairment of
federal antitrust policy. Second, it would lead to the imposition of an
unjustifiably stringent legislative clear articulation requirement on
state agencies, resulting in unwarranted federal interference with the
structure and processes of state government.
An approach to the Parker doctrine that focuses on the state law
locus of authority to prescribe generally applicable competition policy
for the state and on the additional requirement that anticompetitive
private actions receive prospective approval in their specific detail be-
fore a Parker immunity claim will be sustained is more explanatory of
the actual course of Supreme Court and lower decisions dealing with
both state agency and municipal conduct than are approaches based
on agency "capture," on whether the conduct at issue has been ap-
proved by a financially disinterested decision-maker, or on whether
the recognition of immunity would be consistent with allocative
efficiency or principles of direct "Madisonian" democracy. It also
sheds light on a number of troublesome issues, such as the reason why
no active supervision of the actions of municipalities and state agen-
cies is required, what weight should be given to administrative inter-
pretations of statutes and rules, whether retrospective clarifications of
agency policy may provide a basis for immunity, and why two stages of
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initial policy declaration and subsequent specific approval of particu-
lar private arrangements may he required where municipal supervi-
sion of private conduct is at issue but not for all actions of state agen-
cies. A focus on these norms and a clear recognition of the
uniqueness of the antitrust immunity issues presented by state agen-
cies—a trend that has already begun in decisions recognizing the in-
dependent policymaking authority of state administrative agencies in
applying the Parker doctrine—also will contribute to more careful
consideration of the widely varying immunity issues presented by the
multifaceted tasks performed by state administrative agencies and
lead to much needed clarification and development of this important
area of antitrust law.
